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I. Introduction
A. The Thesis of Converging Legal Orders
Globalization causes convergence of legal orders. Or so it is argued.
Law and economics scholars predict that legal orders will move towards
the same efficient end state. They argue that the requirements of globalization will pressure legal orders to converge on the level of economic
efficiency, because regulatory competition between legal orders makes it
impossible for individual legal systems to maintain suboptimal solutions.1 Many comparative lawyers predict a similar convergence. In
particular traditional functionalist comparatists have long held that unification of law was both desirable and unavoidable.2 Their basic argument
is based on functional equivalence and can be summarized as follows:
legal systems may look different because they have different doctrines
and institutions; these differences, however, are only superficial, because
the institutions fulfill the same functions and are therefore actually simi1.
The debate over this issue is immense. For two overview articles, see Anthony
Ogus, Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis to
Comparative Law, 48 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 405 (1999); Ugo A. Mattei, Luisa Antonioli &
Andrea Rossato, Comparative Law and Economics, in 1 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 505, 508–14 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). The convergence
debate has been especially vigorous in corporate law; for an overview, see Jennifer G. Hill,
The Persistent Debate about Convergence in Comparative Corporate Governance, 27 Sydney
L. Rev. 743 (2005). It is not always clear whether convergence is meant to concern form or
substance; see Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or
Function, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 329 (2001).
2.
For the relationship between similarity and difference in comparative law, see Catherine Valcke, Comparative Law as Comparative Jurisprudence—The Comparability of Legal
Systems, 52 Am. J. Comp. L. 713 (2004); Gerhard Dannemann, Comparative Law: Study of
Similarities or Differences?, in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 383 (Mathias
Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
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lar. Realizing that legal orders are already similar in substance should
make it easy to unify the law formally as well.3
Others see legal culture as an obstacle to (or a savior from) such
4
convergence. Culture is portrayed as a bulwark against the exclusive
focus on efficiency that many economists advocate.5 Similarly, comparative lawyers invoke cultural difference as a counterweight to the
6
similarities that functionalist comparatists emphasize.
This suggests that convergence should be difficult where domestic
culture and values are important, such as in criminal law and family law,
but easy in areas such as economic law, where domestic values are
largely similar and transnational contacts put pressure on national legal
systems. Even if culture underpins economic laws,7 it is difficult to see
why this culture should be national and why economic globalization
should not rather create a global culture,8 which in turn should facilitate
legal convergence and unification.
B. The Challenge of Persistent Differences
in International Jurisdiction
This distinction between value-free transnational areas of law that
converge, and value-laden local areas of law that do not, is not in accordance with reality. The biggest challenge for the convergence thesis
comes not from theory but practice: it is not happening. To be sure, we
see considerable convergence in many areas of the law—accounting
standards, corporate governance, and capital markets, for instance.
3.
E.g., Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law 24
(Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998); Ugo Mattei, A Transaction Costs Approach to the European
Civil Code, 5 Eur. Rev. Priv. L. 537 (1997); for discussion, see Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, supra note
2, at 339, 376–78.
4.
For the most outspoken version of this view, see Pierre Legrand, European Legal
Systems Are Not Converging, 45 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 52, 61–62 (1996).
5.
See Association Henri Capitant des Amis de la Culture Juridique Française, Les droits de tradition civiliste en question. À propos des Rapports Doing
Business de la Banque Mondiale 7 (2006), http://www.henricapitant.org/IMG/pdf/
Les_droits_de_tradition_civiliste_en_question.pdf.
6.
See generally Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Rethinking Comparative
Law, 26 Harv. Int’l L.J. 411 (1985); Bernhard Grossfeld, Core Questions of Comparative Law (Vivian Grosswald Curran trans., 2005); Pierre Legrand, Le droit comparé
(1999); Vivian Grosswald Curran, Dealing in Difference: Comparative Law’s Potential for
Broadening Legal Perspectives, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 657 (1998); see also Dannemann, supra
note 2, at 389–91.
7.
Pierre Legrand, Counterpoint: Law Is Also Culture, in The Unification of International Commercial Law 245 (Franco Ferrari ed., 1998).
8.
See Volkmar Gessner, Global Approaches in the Sociology of Law: Problems and
Challenges, 22 J.L. Soc’y 85, 90 (1995); Charles Koch, Envisioning a Global Legal Culture,
25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1 (2003); Russell Menyhart, Changing Identities and Changing Law:
Possibilities for a Global Legal Culture, 10 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 157 (2003).
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Nonetheless, we also see areas of economic law that are surprisingly resistant to convergence. This resistance to change represents a serious
challenge to the convergence thesis and constitutes the focus of this Article.
One area where convergence is not taking place is the law of personal jurisdiction in international cases. Personal jurisdiction is an area
in which the strong interdependence between legal systems suggests that
unification should be desirable or that convergence should occur. Moreover, there is substantive agreement about the values involved: “Most
legal systems recognize the requirement that the parties and the transaction have some connection with that legal system before an organ of that
system—paradigmatically a court—can take action.”9 And yet, U.S. and
European approaches remain remarkably different,10 and mutual understanding remains difficult. Europeans are said to fear U.S. courts like
11
medieval torture chambers; they regularly regard assertions of jurisdiction by U.S. courts as acts of judicial hegemonialism.12 Americans are
barely less concerned over being dragged into European courts. For example, when France asserted jurisdiction over Yahoo! on the mere basis
that its website was accessible from French computers,13 many Americans were outraged.
9.
Eugene F. Scoles, Peter Hay, Patrick J. Borchers & Symeon C. Symeonides,
Conflict of Laws 288 (4th ed. 2004).
10.
E.g. Arthur T. von Mehren, Theory and Practice of Adjudicatory Authority in
Private International Law: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine, Policies and Practices of
Common- and Civil-Law Systems, 295 Recueil des Cours 9 (2002); Samuel P.
Baumgartner, The Proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments 11–73 (2003); Ronald A. Brand, Private Law and Public Regulation in U.S. Courts, 2
CILE Studies 115 (2005); Alegría Borràs, The 1999 Preliminary Draft Hague Convention on
Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: Agreements and Disagreements, in
The Hague Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments 41
(Fausto Pocar & Constanza Honorati eds., 2005).
11.
Brand, supra note 10, at 116.
12.
For a selection of authors from different countries, see Julie Allard & Antoine
Garapon, Les juges dans la mondialisation 36 (2005); Mireille Delmas-Marty, Le
relatif et l’universel 405 (2004); Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony:
Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 369,
400–404 (2005); Ugo Mattei & Jeffrey S. Lena, United States Jurisdiction Over Conflicts
Arising Outside of the US: Some Hegemonic Implications, 1 Global Jurist Topics, No. 2,
Art. 5 (2001), http://www.bepress.com/gj/topics/vol1/iss2/art5; Willibald Posch, Ambulance
Chasing im Dienste US-amerikanischer Rechtshegemonie—Wird “forum shopping” durch in
Österreich tätige Anwälte gesellschaftsfähig? Kritische Anmerkungen zu einem aktuellen
Vorgang, 42 Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung 14 (2001). For criticism of this view,
see Ralf Michaels, US-Gerichte als Weltgerichte. Die Avantgarde der Globalisierung, 31
DAJV-Newsletter 46, 54 (2006).
13.
See Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [court of original jurisdiction] Paris, May 22,
2000 (Fr.), available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20000522-asg.htm.
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Indeed, U.S. and European approaches to jurisdiction are strikingly
different. Some differences concern specific bases of jurisdiction. Does
“doing business” create a sufficient connection to the defendant for the
assertion of jurisdiction? Many Americans still think so,14 while Europeans disagree strongly.15 Can jurisdiction be based on mere service of
process in the forum state? Again, the answer is yes under American
16
17
law, no under European law. Is it justified to assert jurisdiction in
product liability at the place of the injury even if the injurer could not
possibly have expected the injury to occur there? Here, Europeans generally see no problems,18 while Americans believe this would violate the
defendant’s constitutional rights.19 Does the plaintiff’s nationality create
a sufficiently close relationship to assert jurisdiction over a defendant
14.
See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 442 (1952); Russell J. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 216–22 (5th ed. 2006). But
see Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 Cornell L. Rev.
89, 115 (1999) (proposing to abolish doing business jurisdiction in the United States); Stephen
B. Burbank, All the World His Stage, 52 Am. J. Comp. L. 741, 749–53 (2004) (book review)
(questioning the viability of this ground of jurisdiction in its traditional form).
15.
See Rolf A. Schütze, Die Allzuständigkeit amerikanischer Gerichte 14–
15 (2003).
16.
See Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990); for application to international cases, see, e.g., Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985). But
see Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 421, n. 5 (1987) (“Jurisdiction
based on service of process on one only transitorily present in a state is no longer acceptable
under international law if that is the only basis for jurisdiction and the action in question is
unrelated to that state.”).
17.
See Peter F. Schlosser, Lectures on Civil-Law Litigation Systems and American
Cooperation with Those Systems, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 9, 20 (1996). For Americans insisting
that this basis remain, see Andreas Lowenfeld, Thoughts about a Multinational Judgments
Convention: A Reaction to the von Mehren Report, 57 Law & Contemp. Probs. 289, 296
(1994); Peter D. Trooboff, Proposed Hague Conference General Convention on Jurisdiction
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments—Some Thoughts on Finding Solutions to
Tough Issues, in E Pluribus Unum—Liber Amicorum Georges A.L. Droz 461, 463 (Alegría Borrás et al. eds., 1996). Others hoped that abolition of tag jurisdiction in a Hague
Convention could lead to the elimination of this basis in U.S. jurisdictional law; see Clermont,
supra note 14, at 115–6; Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Century
or Beginning of the Millennium?, 7 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 111, 115–16 (1999).
18.
Council Regulation 44/2001, Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 5(3), 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, 4 (EC) [hereinafter
Brussels I]. The precursor to the Regulation was drafted in 1968 (see 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters
(consolidated version), 1998 O.J. (C 27) 1)); Brussels I is distinct from the Brussels II Regulation, which deals with recognition and enforcement of judgments in family law matters.
19.
Ronald A. Brand, Tort Jurisdiction in a Multilateral Convention: The Lessons of the
Due Process Clause and the Brussels Convention, 24 Brook. J. Int’l L. 125, 153–55 (1998)
(arguing that language in leading cases by the European Court of Justice could lead to assertion of jurisdiction that would be unconstitutional under U.S. law); see also Ronald A. Brand,
Due Process, Jurisdiction and a Hague Judgments Convention, 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 661, 695
(1999).
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with no other connections to that country?20 Is the presence of a piece of
the defendant’s property, no matter how small, sufficient for the assertion
21
of unlimited jurisdiction over the defendant? Americans are incredulous
and deeply critical of these bases, which are still available in European
jurisdictions against non-European defendants.22
More general differences concern the style and flexibility of jurisdictional law. American law relies on broad standards of “fairness” and
“reasonableness” that are applied in each individual case. This enables
the judge to focus on achieving justice in individual cases even if it hampers predictability for the parties. European law, by contrast, uses hard
and fast rules that are easier to apply and therefore more predictable but
may lead to unjust results in individual cases.23 In addition, U.S. law provides specific doctrines, such as forum non conveniens and antisuit
injunctions, that give judges discretion to fine-tune and equilibrate24 jurisdiction in individual cases. European law is strongly opposed to both
doctrines, as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has recently made
clear.25 Instead, Europeans consider jurisdictional bases nondiscretionary, resolving the problem of parallel proceedings through a lis
alibi pendens rule that uses a strict formal criterion of which court was
seized of the matter first.26
20.
Code civil [C. civ.] art. 14 (Fr.); see Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B. Palmer, Exorbitant Jurisdiction, 58 Me. L. Rev. 473, 482–503 (2006).
21.
See Zivilprozeßordnung [ZPO] [Civil Procedure Statute] Sept. 12, 1950, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] § 23 (F.R.G.); See also Jurisdiktionsnorm [JN] [Code of Judicial
Organization] Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] 111/1895, § 99(1) (Austria); see von Mehren, supra
note 10, at 174–77.
22.
See Brussels I, supra note 18, art. 4. For reasons for the persistence of these bases in
the Brussels Regulation, see infra text accompanying notes 272–273. As between member
states, these bases are unavailable.
23.
Christian Kohler, Practical Experience of the Brussels Jurisdiction and Judgments
Convention in the Six Original States, 34 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 563, 582 (1985); von Mehren,
supra note 10, at 69–72; Trevor C. Hartley, The European Union and the Systematic Dismantling of the Common Law of Conflict of Laws, 54 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 813, 814 (2005). Note
that this is not the same as the difference between case law and statutory law. Statutes can be
very openly worded, as are many states’ long arm statutes that merely invoke the limits of the
Constitution; precedential rules formulated by courts, by contrast, can be very precise.
24.
For the terminology, see Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the
Proposed Hague Convention and Progress in National Law, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 203, 205–06
(2001); von Mehren, supra note 10, at 306.
25.
Case C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 2004 E.C.R. I-3565 (holding antisuit injunctions
incompatible with the Brussels Regulation); Case C-281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I1383 (holding forum non conveniens incompatible with the Brussels Regulation); for critical
analyses, see Richard Fentiman, National Law and the European Jurisdiction Regime, in International Civil Litigation in Europe and Relations With Third States 83 (Arnaud
Nuyts & Nadine Watté eds., 2005); Hartley, supra note 23.
26.
Brussels I, supra note 18, art. 27.
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Still other differences concern sources of law and relevant actors.27
The U.S. law of jurisdiction has long been constitutionalized, while
28
European law remains sub-constitutional. In the United States, the most
important source of rules and principles on jurisdiction is the U.S. Constitution, notably its Due Process Clause.29 In Europe, by contrast, the
most important source is a subconstitutional legislative instrument, the
30
Brussels I Judgment Regulation (Brussels Regulation); the basis in na31
tional legal systems is statutory law. As a consequence, different actors
have been primarily involved in the development of jurisdictional rules
and principles. In the United States, this task has been left almost exclusively to judges.32 In Europe, on the other hand, the task traditionally
falls mostly to legislators, though the ECJ plays an increasingly important role.
These differences are not only significant, but they are also difficult
to surmount. This became clear during negotiations at the Hague towards
a Worldwide Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. In
1996, the Hague Conference on Private International Law had accepted a
proposal by the American delegation to develop such an instrument.33
Although expectations and ambitions had been grand,34 negotiations soon
35
36
proved difficult. Some compromises on individual issues were reached,
27.
See von Mehren, supra note 10, at 72–74.
28.
But see infra part IV.A for the plaintiff’s quasi-constitutional right to a forum.
29.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause has not been an important source after the Supreme Court decision in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); see infra note 144.
30.
Brussels I, supra note 18.
31.
This is not true without exception. The right of Swiss domiciliaries to be sued only
in their home forum enjoyed constitutional protection until 1998 in Bundesverfassung art.
59(1). See Baumgartner, supra note 10, at 147–49.
32.
von Mehren, supra note 10, at 95.
33.
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Final Act of the Eighteenth Session, in Proceedings of the Eighteenth Session 29, 47 (1996) (The Hague, 1999).
34.
Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition of United States Judgments Abroad and Foreign
Judgments in the United States: Would an International Convention Be Useful?, 57 Rabels
Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht [RabelsZ] 449
(1993); see also Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments—
A New Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 Law & Contemp. Probs. 271 (1994); Haimo
Schack, Perspektiven eines weltweiten Anerkennungs- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommens, 1
Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht [ZEuP] 306, 317–32 (1993).
35.
For a detailed account, see David McClean, The Hague Conference’s Judgments
Project, in Reform and Development of Private International Law—Essays in Honour of Sir Peter North 255 (John Fawcett ed., 2002).
36.
For examples of compromises, see Arthur T. von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on
International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable World-wide: Can
the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 191, 195–96 (2001); Ronald A.
Brand, Current Problems, Common Ground, and First Principles: Restructuring the
Preliminary Draft Convention Text, in A Global Law of Jurisdiction and Judgments:
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but a draft convention circulated in 199937 proved so unpopular, especially with the U.S. delegation,38 that the intended vote on the convention
in 2000 was postponed. Instead of moving forward with the convention
as planned, the delegations scaled back the negotiations to a convention
on choice of court agreements, which was concluded in the summer of
39
2005 but has not, as of September 2006, been signed by any member
state.40 Regardless of whether this convention will be successful,41 it
represents a serious retreat from the much greater ambitions associated
with the original project.
These differences between U.S. and European approaches to jurisdiction and the difficulties facing unification projects present a serious
challenge to the convergence thesis. Traditional explanations for the intractability of the differences seem insufficient. In theory, the differences
could be attributed to a lack of interdependence and communication. But
there has been ample exposure, debate, and good will, both during negotiations in the Hague and amongst scholars in general, and still no
substantial agreement has emerged. Differences could also arise from
divergent goals. Indeed, to some extent private litigation has a stronger
regulatory nature in the United States than it does in Europe.42 Yet by and
Lessons from the Hague Convention 75 (John J. Barceló III & Kevin M. Clermont eds.,
2002).
37.
Hague Conference on Private International Law—Enforcement of Judgments, Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters adopted by the Special Commission and Report by Peter Nygh and Fausto Pocar,
Prelim. Doc. No. 11 (August 2000), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/
jdgmpd11.pdf.
38.
See Letter from Jeffrey Kovar, Assistant Legal Advisor for Private Int’l Law, U.S.
Dept. of State, to J.H.A. van Loon, Secretary General, Hague Conf. on Private Int’l Law (Feb.
22, 2000), 25 DAJV-Newsletter 44 (2000); available at http://legalminds.lp.findlaw.com/
list/intpil/doc00003.doc; von Mehren, supra note 36, at 194–196.
39.
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005 [hereinafter
Hague Convention], 44 I.L.M. 1294 (2005).
40.
Status Table of the Hague Convention, available at http://www.hcch.net/
index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98.
41.
For positive views, see Ronald A. Brand, The New Hague Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements, Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Insights, July 26, 2005, http://www.asil.org/insights/
2005/07/insights050726.html; Giesela Rühl, Das Haager Übereinkommen über die Vereinbarung gerichtlicher Zuständigkeiten: Rückschritt oder Fortschritt? 25 Praxis des
Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 410 (2005); Louise Ellen Teitz,
The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating Party Autonomy and Providing an Alternative to Arbitration, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 543 (2005). For some doubts, see Christian
Thiele, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements—Was it Worth the Effort? in
Conflict of Laws in a Globalizing World: Essays in Memory of Arthur T. von Mehren (Eckart Gottschalk, Ralf Michaels, Giesela Rühl & Jan von Hein eds., forthcoming
2007).
42.
See Paul D. Carrington, The American Tradition of Private Law Enforcement, 5
German L.J. 1413 (2004), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?
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large Americans and Europeans pursue similar goals with their laws on
jurisdiction,43 and still each side is deeply critical of the methods the
other side employs to reach those goals. Differences could reflect varied
cultural values. But general cultural differences are not significant
enough to explain the substantial differences in such a technical area as
the law of jurisdiction.
C. The Argument from Legal Paradigms
This Article suggests a response to these challenges that builds on
the work of both functional comparatists and students of culture, but
provides a way to explain the persistence of differences that overcomes
the limits of both: legal paradigms. The hypothesis is that Americans and
Europeans do not simply think differently about how to apply jurisdiction; they even think differently about what jurisdiction is. Americans
and Europeans disagree on the answers because they disagree on the
relevant questions. Similarities of goals notwithstanding, each side remains in its own paradigm of jurisdiction, and these paradigms are
significantly different. Paradigms explain not only why these differences
exist, but also why they remain stable despite all the transatlantic efforts
at agreement and the relative similarity of goals and values. This explanation is seemingly paradoxical: convergence and unification are
difficult not because of differences but because of similarities. Precisely
because American and European law provide functionally equivalent
methods for resolving the same problems, they cannot agree on, much
less unify, these methods.
Propounding the notion of paradigmatic difference between U.S. and
European thinking about jurisdiction makes important contributions both
to the law of jurisdiction and to the theories and methods of comparative
law. The contribution to the law of jurisdiction is both explanatory and
evaluative. On a macro-level, exploring paradigmatic difference contributes to a mutual understanding of the structure within which Americans
and Europeans think about issues of jurisdiction. Broadly, Americans
adopt an “in or out” paradigm that is vertical, unilateral, domestic, and
political, while Europeans adopt an “us or them” paradigm that is horizontal, multilateral, international, and apolitical. On a micro-level,
understanding paradigmatic difference can provide a single explanation
for a wide variety of differences between U.S. and European jurisdictional theory and practice. Taken together, paradigmatic difference
suggests mutual criticism tends to be biased. As long as each side argues
id=523; Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 Va. J. Int’l L. 251
(2006).
43.
See Scoles et al., supra note 9; see also infra, text accompanying notes 57, 58.
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from within its own paradigm, the approach taken by the other side must
necessarily seem deficient.
The second field to which the idea of a paradigmatic difference
makes a contribution is the theory of convergence, legal unification, and
comparative law. The common understanding is that unification is easy
where legal systems are functionally equivalent because each side agrees
on the goals and disagrees only on the means. Unification is difficult,
according to this account, only where goal preferences differ strongly.
By contrast, this Article shows how functional equivalence between different legal orders makes unification more difficult to achieve. Precisely
where different legal orders reach similar results by different means,
within different legal paradigms, it is very costly for them to unify those
means, while the benefits from unification are rather slim. Although the
theory of legal paradigms builds on functionalist comparative law, it
represents a significant elaboration that can account for difference and
for culture.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II.A. presents two explanations frequently given to explain the differences between U.S. and
European jurisdictional law, and shows that both are ultimately insufficient. Part II.B. introduces functional comparison and show how it can
actually help stabilize, rather than overcome, difference. Part II.C. introduces the concept of paradigms and paradigmatic difference as a more
promising explanation for these differences.
Part III develops this hypothesis by laying out two different paradigms underlying different legal systems—a vertical, domestic,
unilateral, political paradigm for U.S. law (Part III.A.), and a horizontal,
international, multilateral, apolitical paradigm for European laws (Part
III.B.). An important finding in these two sections is that each of the
paradigms has ways of accounting for those considerations that are fundamental to the other paradigm, but in different ways: through
subsumption under its own terms, and through externalization to other
institutions than the law of jurisdiction.
Part IV applies the findings of paradigmatic difference to five specific issues on which Americans and Europeans disagree: the role of due
process; the discrimination against foreign plaintiffs in U.S. courts and
against foreign defendants in European courts; the relevance of state
boundaries and extraterritoriality; attitudes towards forum non conveniens, antisuit injunctions, and lis alibi pendens; and negotiation styles in
the efforts to conclude a worldwide judgments convention in the Hague.
Part V concludes.
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II. Theoretical Foundations
How can the differences between U.S. and European approaches to
the law of personal jurisdiction be explained? Are they differences at the
level of individual rules and preferences that could be resolved through
compromise? Do they reflect differences of culture and societal priorities? Are they rather differences in levels of analysis, wherein Americans
and Europeans ask and address entirely different questions? Or are they
manifestations of deeper underlying differences between American and
European jurisdictional thought? These questions must be answered before chances for mutual understanding can be assessed. While traditional
functionalist comparative law cannot account for the differences, once it
is enriched with insights from competing theories, a new theory of legal
paradigms emerges that can.
A. Two Partial Explanations
1. A Superficial Difference of Form?
The persistent differences between U.S. and European laws of jurisdiction present a puzzle for functionalist comparative law. Comparatists
in this camp presume that legal systems differ only in their doctrine but
not in their results; functional comparison discovers similar solutions to
similar problems.44 Accordingly, comparatists expect prevailing differences between approaches to jurisdiction to be surmountable through
mutual understanding or compromise. They find convergence between
approaches either actually occurring or at least possible, and they have
had some success in explaining that convergence. Scholars have discovered European equivalents to the U.S. practice of granting jurisdiction
based on doing business45 and U.S. equivalents to unconventional European bases of jurisdiction.46 They have found European opposition to
44.
The classical locus for this postulate is Zweigert & Kötz, supra, note 3, at 40; for
discussion, see Michaels, supra note 3, at 369–72.
45.
Ronald A. Brand, The 1999 Hague Preliminary Draft Convention Text on Jurisdiction and Judgments: A View From the United States, in The Hague Preliminary Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments 3, 17–28 (Fausto Pocar & Constanza Honorati eds., 2005); See Harald Müller, Die Gerichtspflichtigkeit wegen “doing business”:
Ein Vergleich zwischen dem US-amerikanischen und dem deutschen Zuständigkeitssystem 221–55 (1992).
46.
See generally Ronald A. Brand, Jurisdictional Common Ground: In Search of a
Global Convention, in Law and Justice in a Multistate World—Essays in Honor of
Arthur T. von Mehren 11, 20–21 (James A.R. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds.,
2002).
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forum non conveniens to be less consistent than claimed47 and U.S. reliance on tag jurisdiction less strongly supported than thought.48 Where
differences exist, functional comparatists have set out to determine
which of the solutions is superior: they have been willing to accept
European solutions into U.S. law when those solutions seemed more
49
rational—for example, the existence of detailed rules —and they have
suggested Europeans adopt U.S. solutions where those seemed superior—for example, constitutionalization of jurisdictional rules.50
All this comparative law work is extremely important. It has provided invaluable insights into functional similarities between seemingly
different legal systems. It has shown that the differences between U.S.
and European law are relative and contingent. Some differences exist
more in perception than in reality, some are real but not decisive because
they do not lead to different results, and others are real and decisive but
not central. Indeed, without such comparative analysis, the Hague negotiations would not have been possible.
However, the strength of the analysis is its greatest weakness. If indeed the differences are negligible, then it is unclear why they persist
and why negotiations at the Hague to overcome them failed. If indeed
Americans and Europeans pursue the same goals with their laws on jurisdiction, it is unclear why no convention can be concluded that is based
on these similar goals. After all, the negotiations at the Hague were an
extremely serious and thorough attempt at mutual understanding between experts. Their ultimate failure is even more remarkable given that
the negotiators, as experts in conflict of laws, can be expected to have
even more in common than the societies they represent.51 If not even
these serious negotiations led to agreement, it seems implausible to argue that the problem is lack of debate or good will. This suggests these
differences are not themselves decisive, but rather are symptomatic of
deeper rifts.
47.
See, e.g., Arnaud Nuyts, L’exception de forum non conveniens (Étude de
Droit International Privé Comparé) 368–456 (2003).
48.
Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 Cornell L.
Rev. 89, 111–12 (1999).
49.
Id. at 107–10; Kevin M. Clermont, The Role of Private International Law in the
United States: Beating the Not-Quite-Dead Horse of Jurisdiction, 2 CILE Studies 75, 104,
110–11 (2005).
50.
Arnaud Nuyts, Due Process and Fair Trial: Jurisdiction in the United States and in
Europe Compared, 2 CILE Studies 27, 48–60 (2005).
51.
See the analysis by Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization
in International Commercial Law, 39 Va. J. Int’l L. 743, 753–61 (1999).
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2. A Deep Difference of Cultural Values?
Can legal culture account for the differences? Indeed, some point to
cultural and sociological differences between Americans and Europeans
52
as an explanation for the differences in approach to jurisdiction. Since
culture is an amorphous concept, it may be helpful to turn to Lawrence
53
Friedman’s distinction between two kinds of legal culture. External
legal culture describes the general attitude of society towards the law and
the goals it assigns to law. Internal legal culture, by contrast, describes
the thoughts, modes, and institutions of participants in the legal system.
Although a comprehensive analysis is beyond what can be done for
this Article, the explanation from external culture seems implausible. For
differences in external culture to explain the differences in jurisdictional
law, two basic assumptions would have to be met: first, a country’s law
of jurisdiction must reflect the attitudes of its people; second, Americans
and Europeans must have different attitudes regarding the issues relevant
to the law of jurisdiction. Both assumptions, though certainly not wrong,
have their explanatory limits.
First, the intuition that the law reflects a society’s preferences is
problematic. Even if societies as such have preferences that transcend
the differences between the preferences held by their members, it is
doubtful that such preferences are reflected directly in the “semiautonomous”54 field of law. Public choice theory has shown that even
statutory law in democratic countries reflects the preferences of legislators and highly interested, well-organized lobbying groups rather than
those of society at large. Judge-made law is a similarly inexact mechanism for adapting the law to such extralegal preferences, especially in
rather technical and procedural areas like the law of jurisdiction. The
52.
See Willibald Posch, Resolving Business Disputes Through Litigation or Other
Alternatives: The Effects of Jurisdictional Rules and Recognition Practice, 26 Hous. J. Int’l
L. 363, 383 (2004); Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Conflict and Jurisdictional Equilibration: Paths to a Via Media?, 26 Hous. J. Int’l L. 385, 392–93 (2004). In a more general
context, Oscar Chase has recently tried to explain American peculiarities with the special
culture of the United States. Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative
Procedure, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 277 (2002); see also Oscar G. Chase, Law, Culture, and
Ritual: Disputing Systems in Cross-Cultural Context 78–79, 92–93 (2005) (explaining discretion in personal jurisdiction with American exceptionalism).
53.
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Legal System 223 (1975) (“The external legal
culture is the legal culture of the general population; the internal legal culture is the legal culture of those members of society who perform specialized legal tasks.”). For a critical
analysis, see Roger Cotterrell, The Concept of Legal Cultures, in Comparing Legal Cultures 13, 17 (David Nelken ed., 1997).
54.
Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Field as an
Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 Law & Soc’y Rev. 719 (1973).
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explanations from external culture therefore risk circularity:55 legal rules
and institutions are thought to mirror a society’s cultural preferences, but
then the only way to determine the society’s preferences is to look at its
laws. Americans have the jurisdictional regime they have because they
want it, and we know they want this regime because they have not
changed it. Whether this congruence of legal regime and societal preferences exists is unknowable because the hypothesis cannot be tested or
falsified.
Second, even if one grants the logical priority of societal preferences
over legal regimes, it is still doubtful whether attitudinal differences between Americans and Europeans are significant enough to explain the
differences in approach.56 American exceptionalism, a popular topic at
least since de Tocqueville,57 has often been exaggerated. Extreme cultural
differences would be counterintuitive between societies that are so similar in economic, political, and historical respects.
If external legal culture does not provide a sufficient explanation,
then internal legal culture well may. Indeed, the different ways in which
Americans and Europeans talk about jurisdiction and the different issues
they consider relevant suggest a difference in internal legal culture.
American and European lawyers think differently about jurisdictional
issues because each side is constrained by the framework within which it
conceives of the subject.
However, this explanation has two shortcomings as well. First, its
focus on the views of individual actors in the legal system is unsatisfactory: individual views are hard to determine, and the rationality of the
legal system as a whole likely transcends that of any one participant in it.
The knowledge sought is therefore rather one of the system itself than of
its participants. Second, the explanation does not explain in what specific
way the internal legal culture of one side differs from the other. Again,
simply to say that the laws are different because the internal legal cultures are different becomes a circular explanation if the claim of
difference between legal cultures merely restates the differences between
laws. What is required is a more specific analysis of the relationship between individual legal provisions and institutions and the legal system as
55.
William B. Ewald, What’s So Special About American Law?, 26 Okla. City U. L.
Rev. 1083, 1098 (2001); David Nelken, Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation, in Adapting Legal Cultures 7, 27 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001).
56.
Clermont, supra note 49, at 96.
57.
See Chase, American “Exceptionalism”, supra note 52, for a discussion of the
influence of American culture on civil procedure; for a recent overview of American exceptionalism, see Mark B. Rotenberg, America’s Ambiguous Exceptionalism, 3 U. St. Thomas
L.J. 188 (2005).
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a whole, between the goals of the law of jurisdiction broadly understood
and the means used to achieve those goals.
B. Functional Equivalence
A proper explanation for the differences between U.S. and European
thinking about jurisdiction must pull these insights together. On the one
hand, it must remain within the law without taking recourse to general
societal culture, because culture and its relation to the legal rules and
institutions are unclear. On the other hand, it must go beyond not only
the realm of mere individual rules, but also that of style and of
institutions and sources of law. It must show how the individual
peculiarities of legal systems are linked to each other to create a coherent
whole. In short, the explanation must encompass the law as a whole, but
nothing beyond the law. What starts as a functionalist micro-comparison
between individual rules becomes a macro-comparison between entire
systems of law.
1. A Difference of Levels of Analysis?
Indeed, closer analysis reveals that not one but (at least) two functions are present in jurisdictional law and theory in the United States as
in Europe. The U.S. Supreme Court formulated these two functions of
the law of jurisdiction as follows: “It protects the defendant against the
burden of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the
limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal
system.”58 These two functions are not peculiar to the United States; they
are also fundamental to European jurisdictional law.59
Although Americans and Europeans agree on these two objectives,
they do not use their laws on jurisdiction for the same functions. Unknowingly, American and European approaches to jurisdiction are
responses to different questions asked, as an insightful recent article by
60
Arnaud Nuyts shows. Nuyts’ main point is that the principles developed
under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the rules of
the Brussels Regulation “each operate at a different level and accordingly
58.
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). The respective
role of these two goals is unclear in view of Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
59.
Ralf Michaels, Re-Placements—Jurisdiction for Contracts and Torts under the
Brussels I Regulation when Arts. 5(1) and 5(3) Do Not Designate a Place in a Member State,
in International Civil Litigation in Europe and Relations With Third States, supra
note 25, at 151.
60.
Nuyts, supra note 50.
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cannot be directly compared.”61 If the American focus is on the protection of due process, while the European emphasis is on listing available
bases of jurisdiction, this is not just another difference between the two
approaches; it is evidence that the U.S. Constitution and the Brussels
Regulation serve different purposes. What Americans mean by “jurisdiction” is simply not the same as what Europeans mean by the term. For
Nuyts, it follows that the U.S. Constitution and the Brussels Regulation
cannot be meaningfully compared, because they are not functionally
equivalent. A proper approach must compare rules serving the same
functions.62 It must find the functional equivalent for the Due Process
Clause in European law, and the functional equivalent for the Brussels
Regulation in U.S. law.
The first of the two levels of analysis Nuyts proposes is the delimitation of the outer limits of jurisdiction. In the United States, this level is
occupied by the U.S. Supreme Court, which has been careful to make
clear that it identifies only the boundaries of jurisdiction, not jurisdictional rules themselves.63 A “one-step test” of jurisdiction, whereby
64
jurisdiction would simply be conferred by the U.S. Constitution, is not
in accordance with U.S. law. It is often claimed that such constitutional
control of jurisdiction is absent or at least deficient in the European context.65 Nuyts points out, however, that Article 6(1) of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the safeguard of a fair trial in
Europe, has the potential to perform the same functions as the Due Process Clause in the United States.66 Indeed, he can cite to one little known
decision of the European Commission on Human Rights for limiting
jurisdiction under traditional English law.67
61.
Id. at 30 (emphasis in original).
62.
Zweigert & Kötz, supra note 3, at 34.
63.
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 106 (1987);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S.
770, 775 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
64.
See Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982).
65.
For developments in German law, see von Mehren, supra note 10, at 142–178.
66.
Nuyts, supra note 47, at 50–60; see also Pascal Grolimund, Human Rights and
Jurisdiction: General Observations and Impact on the Doctrines of Forum Non Conveniens
and Forum Conveniens, 4 Eur. J.L. Reform 87 (2002); Emmanuel Guinchard, Procès équitable (article 6 CESDH) et droit international privé, in International Civil Litigation in
Europe and Third States 199 (Arnaud Nuyts & Nadine Watté eds., 2005); Dany Cohen, La
Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et le droit international privé français, 78 Revue Critique de Droit International Privé 451, 463 (1989); contra Jonathan Hill, The
Exercise of Jurisdiction in Private International Law, in Asserting Jurisdiction: International and European Perspectives 39, 40–41 (Capps, Evans & Konstadinidis eds., 2003).
67.
Decision of the European Commision on Human Rights, Complaint No. 6200/73,
May 13, 1976 (unpublished), in 2 Digest of Strasbourg Case-Law Relating to the
European Convention on Human Rights 269 (1984); see also Adrian Briggs & Peter
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The second level in Nuyts’ proposed two-level analysis is the elaboration of specific rules. In Europe, the elaboration of such rules is carried
68
out in the provisions of the Brussels Regulation. Although in the United
States such rules are often all but ignored in practice, the Constitution
alone is not sufficient here, either. Jurisdiction of state courts is a matter
of state law and therefore requires a basis in state law, either in common
law or in a statutory provision.69 The same is true, with exceptions (especially for federal statutory authority), for federal courts, whose
jurisdiction is governed by the rules of the state in which they are situated.70 The statutes of many states do not add any further restrictions to
those granted by the U.S. Constitution; they extend jurisdiction accord71
ing to the limits of the U.S. Constitution. But some states such as New
York that deal frequently with international commercial litigation have
rules on jurisdiction that are hardly less specific than the rules of the
Brussels Regulation.72 Nuyts argues that this second step of jurisdictional
analysis should be enhanced in the United States.73
Nuyts’ analysis is eye-opening, because it moves into the spotlight of
jurisdictional analysis two bodies of law that have traditionally been
largely ignored: the European Convention on Human Rights and the
states’ long-arm statutes in the United States. Moreover, the two-level
analysis provides a good explanation for many of the differences between U.S. and European law on jurisdiction. If the function of U.S. law
is the protection of substantive rights of defendants, it is not surprising
that U.S. law is based on the Constitution, shaped by judges, formulated
in standards and principles rather than rules, and aimed at individual
cases rather than general consistency. The case law of the European
Court of Human Rights is quite similar in all these regards, and if indeed
Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments 12, 19 (Peter Rees ed., 3d ed. 2002). Since all
these decisions and authors concerned English law of jurisdiction, which is in many ways
similar to that in the United States, they do not represent clear precedents for a similar function of ECHR Art. 6(1) for civil law rules or even the Brussels I Regulation. But see Cass. civ.,
Mar. 30, 2004, JCP 2004 II 10097 at 1129 (discussing but rejecting a violation of Art. 6(1) by
French Civil Code Art. 15).
68.
Supra note 18.
69.
Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Century or Beginning of
the Millennium?, 7 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 111, 112–14 (1999).
70.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); for further exceptions, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(B) and
4(k)(2).
71.
For analysis of this issue, see Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How LongArm Statutes Extended to the Limits of Due Process, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 491, 525–531 (2004);
for a slightly different grouping, see Weintraub, supra, note 14, at 203–05.
72.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 2003). Some state courts have wrenched restricting
language out of shape to achieve as much jurisdiction as permitted. But see Schlosser, supra
note 17, at 21 (“[N]othing exists in civil-law countries which could properly be called a longarm statute”).
73.
Nuyts, supra note 50, at 66–67; see also Clermont, supra note 49, at 104, 110–12.
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that Court accepted Nuyts’ challenge and took on jurisdiction, there is no
reason to think it would act much differently. On the other hand, where
U.S. courts are asked to interpret long arm statutes independently from
the U.S. Constitution, they defer to statutory texts, apply hard and fast
rules rather than open standards, and thereby enhance consistency rather
than justice in the individual case.74
Theoretically, U.S. and European law could converge on the path
Nuyts describes. More constitutional control of jurisdiction in Europe
would soften criticism of European law as unjust. If American law of
jurisdiction developed more in state law and through legislators, the
Constitution could be reserved, as has been demanded repeatedly, to the
role of an outer limit. At present, however, neither is the case, and this is
a situation that Nuyts’ analysis alone cannot explain. If “it is not difficult
to find examples in the Brussels Convention/Regulation where the fair
trial doctrine could alter traditional ways in which the rules of jurisdiction are applied,”75 an explanation is needed for why such alterations
have not yet taken place. Nuyts’ comparison of the two steps cannot explain why each legal system concentrates its debates on only one of the
two levels.
2. Functional Equivalence and the Stability of Difference
Nuyts’ analysis provides a good tool to explain the difference, but
not its persistence. An explanation for this persistence lies in path dependency. The fact that one of the levels of jurisdictional analysis is
inadequately elaborated in each of the two legal systems means that the
respective institution acting mainly on one level must also fulfill the requirements posed on the other level. This explains why the U.S.
Constitution and the Brussels Regulation are more important, respectively, than the long arm statutes and the European Convention on
76
Human Rights. It also explains why they can remain stronger. The
Brussels Regulation and the U.S. Constitution are, in fact, functionally
equivalent, because each of them fulfills both functions.
In the United States, the Due Process Clause is used for far more
77
than determination of broad outer limits; by now it provides, together
74.
Clermont, supra note 49, at 102–103, 105.
75.
Nuyts, supra note 50, at 58.
76.
This does not rule out other possible explanations. For example, both the European
Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights are much younger
and weaker than the U.S. Constitution and the U.S. Supreme Court. However, this explanation
is made less plausible in view of the fact that the European Court of Human Rights has been
quite active in other areas of the law, such as privacy and discrimination law.
77.
Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do with Jurisdiction?, 46 Rutgers
L. Rev. 1071 (1994).
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with the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court, a detailed system of rules
and principles of jurisdiction. This was not always so. James Weinstein
has shown how much of today’s jurisdictional law was developed originally as sub-constitutional federal law, not as constitutional law.78 Yet
after the Pennoyer decision in 1878, the Constitution became the most
important source of jurisdictional law, and when federal common law
was all but abolished in 1938,79 further development moved, unlike other
areas of the law, down to the states, but rather up to the level of the U.S.
Constitution. Some of the detailed rules developed by the Supreme Court
cannot be derived from the Due Process Clause, either because they have
nothing to do with due process,80 or because they are incompatible with
81
the normal interpretation of the clause. Nonetheless, since state law,
both statutory and common law, has been all but irrelevant in the development of jurisdictional legal thinking, the task of formulating
jurisdictional rules remained, necessarily, with the U.S. Constitution and
the courts applying it. Even if detailed jurisdictional rules exist in state
law, courts nonetheless frequently focus almost their entire analysis on
the Constitution.82 Although critics ask the Supreme Court to restrict its
opinions on jurisdiction to the prevention of truly outrageous violations
of due process,83 path dependency ensures that the role of the Due Process Clause remains prominent. Since U.S. Constitutional jurisprudence is
now relatively detailed, state legislators could codify these rules or restrict jurisdiction further, but there is no political incentive for them to do
either.
In Europe, the opposite is true. The ECJ has developed the seemingly technical rules of the Brussels Regulation into a system in which
the protection of defendants, codified in Article 2 (which gives general
jurisdiction to the courts at the defendant’s domicile) has quasiconstitutional status.84 One may argue that these restrictions are not part
of the Regulation itself. However, like in the United States, path
78.
James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 Va. L. Rev. 169, 192–204 (2004) (analyzing cases before
Pennoyer v. Neff that emphasized the service requirement for jurisdiction).
79.
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
80.
Weinstein, supra note 78, at 174 (“Nor will the Court ever be able to fully explain
in due process terms rules formulated primarily to vindicate structural values rather than individual rights.”); see also Clermont, supra note 49, at 101 (“The well-known failures of the
current law flow from the U.S. Supreme Court trying to do too much in shaping that law out
of the few bare words of the Constitution.”).
81.
Weinstein, supra note 78, at 270–276.
82.
See, e.g., Int’l Techs. Consultants, Inc. v. Euroglas S.A., 107 F.3d 386, 391, 393 (6th
Cir. 1997).
83.
See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State Courts: Time for Change, 63 Or. L. Rev. 485, 527–28 (1984).
84.
See infra Part III.B.
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dependency makes the state of affairs relatively stable. The more willing
the Court of Justice is to read restrictions into the text of the Brussels
Regulation, the less desirable or necessary it becomes for other institutions like the European Court of Human Rights to interfere on the basis
of other texts.
C. Paradigmatic Difference
Path dependency can explain why difference exist, but cannot, by itself, account for what constitutes this difference. This is where
paradigms become attractive.
1. The Idea of Legal Paradigms
Although the concept of the paradigm is frequently invoked without
clear definition, it is possible to develop a sufficiently clear concept for
the purpose of comparative law. Mark Van Hoecke and Mark Warrington, drawing on Thomas Kuhn,85 define a paradigm as
the common framework within which theories are developed and
scientific discussions are pursued. It implies a common scientific
language, a common set of concepts and a common basic world
view. If one does not accept the commonly used concepts and/or
the commonly accepted ideology, it is no longer possible to develop theories within that science as it has been traditionally
86
conceived.
A legal paradigm is, thus, a thought pattern, an epistemic background for analysis, the way participants of a legal system discuss
matters of jurisdiction. A paradigm does not define specific rules or institutions—different views on almost any issue are possible within one
paradigm. Instead, a paradigm defines what questions are relevant for
analysis and what kinds of factors can be relevant. Since paradigms are
often unstated, they must be induced from the actual practice of participants in the analysis. The way judges and scholars argue about issues of
jurisdiction reveals their (often unstated) basic understanding of jurisdiction.
Paradigms are different from principles. Principles bring coherence
to an otherwise seemingly disparate body of case law by revealing basic
valuations underlying whole areas of the law, provided either explicitly
85.
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 11, passim (2d
ed. 1970).
86.
Mark Van Hoecke & Mark Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal
Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 495, 513
(1998).
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by lawmakers or implicitly by the development of the law. For example,
the general idea that plaintiffs must seek out defendants (actor sequitur
forum rei), often invoked by the ECJ for the interpretation of rules, is a
principle of European jurisdictional law.87 This focus on broad areas of
the law is a quality principles share with paradigms. But principles are
not paradigms. While principles determine, at least to some degree, the
answers to questions, paradigms determine the structure in which questions are asked and answered. Grossly divergent answers to a question
are impossible within one principle, but they are quite possible within
one paradigm. Principles are a matter for debate within a legal community; paradigms are the epistemic frameworks within which these
debates take place. The actor sequitur forum rei principle can be explained on the basis of the European paradigm of jurisdiction,88 but it is
not a necessary part of that paradigm.
Paradigms also differ from concepts. Of course, saying that Americans and Europeans understand the term jurisdiction differently implies
that they have different concepts of jurisdiction. But paradigms are more
than concepts because they contain not just the meaning of a particular
institution, but rather the whole set of instruments, argumentative modes,
and theories connected with this institution, as well as other, related institutions. An analysis of jurisdiction as a concept will focus on what that
notion implies in a given legal system. An analysis of the paradigm of
jurisdiction will focus also on related doctrines and their interaction and
mutual interdependency with the institution properly called jurisdiction.
Paradigms differ from theories.89 Both paradigms and theories of jurisdiction provide modes of analysis considered appropriate for a certain
legal issue, but there are three important differences. First, paradigms act
on a more abstract and general level than theories; indeed, they can encompass several theories. For example, different theories have been
developed for U.S. law of jurisdiction—power theories, relational theories, fairness and convenience theories. While these theories compete
with each other, they are all developed within, and compatible with, one
paradigm of jurisdiction.90 Second, theories can be tested and falsified by
results; one theory is superior to another if it can better account for specific results. Paradigms, by contrast, are compatible with different
87.
See, e.g., Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Co. SA v. Universal Gen. Ins.
Co., 2000 E.C.R. I-5925, paras. 34–35; Nuyts, supra note 47, at 672–76. For a U.S. law perspective, cf. Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 610, 667
(1988) (“general jurisdiction should be retained solely at a defendant’s home base”).
88.
See infra, part IV.B.
89.
Legal theory is a problematic concept, too. See James Penner, Decent Burials for
Dead Concepts, 58 Current Legal Probs. 313 (2005).
90.
See infra Part III.A.

MICHAELS FTP3.DOC

1024

1/2/2007 11:15 AM

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 27:1003

results. They can be tested and falsified, not against results, but against
modes of thought and types of argument. Specific arguments and theories
may be more compatible with one paradigm than with another, as will be
shown with the different U.S. theories in the European context.91 Third,
and perhaps most importantly, theories are necessarily manifest, while
paradigms can be latent. In this regard, analysis of paradigms starts
where theories end, because such analysis can reveal underlying, yet unrecognized, similarities between different theories.
In their focus on latent, manifest aspects of the law, paradigms share
characteristics with external legal culture or mentalité.92 External legal
culture, at least in the way the concept is frequently used in comparative
law, denotes an extralegal set of values and practices that explains the
behavior of legal actors. It can thus explain different theories of jurisdiction with regard to different institutional and societal factors. For
example, the expansive approach that U.S. courts take towards jurisdiction might be explained with the societal emphasis on incentives for
plaintiffs and their lawyers, for judges seeking reelections, or the general
societal interest in achieving justice for victims. All these explanations
focus on factors external to the law. By contrast, a paradigm defines the
inner structure of a legal system and the way in which participants discuss it. Its explanations for the arguments made, and the consequences
drawn, are intrinsic to the legal system, not extrinsic to it. In this sense,
paradigms are more closely related to internal legal culture.
2. Subsumption and Externalization of Competing Considerations
It is important to note that paradigms do not reflect differences in
values; they reflect different ways of dealing with potentially similar
preferences. Nonetheless, values play a unique role in each paradigm.
For example, I will argue that the U.S. paradigm of jurisdiction focuses
mainly on the vertical relationship between the court and the parties,
neglecting the horizontal relationship between different states or countries. This means that certain values—the protection of defendants, for
example—can easily be conceptualized, while other, possibly competing
values—the protection of legitimate interests of other states—cannot.
This does not mean these competing values necessarily play a lesser role
in the legal system as a whole, but it does mean that they are more difficult to conceptualize within one paradigm. Paradigms require a relative
degree of inherent consistency, but they must also account in some way
for the internal frictions and tensions of the legal system that tend to un91.
Infra Part III.B.1.
92.
See H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Cultures and Legal Traditions, in Epistemology and
Methodology of Comparative Law 7 (Mark Van Hoecke ed., 2004).
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dermine this consistency. Paradigms have two specific ways of dealing
with considerations that seem to undermine them: one is to subsume
them into their own mode of thought; the other is to externalize them to
other areas of the law.
Subsumption involves the translation of ideas that are incompatible
with a certain paradigm into ideas that are compatible. Although, for instance, the horizontal relation between a court and foreign states cannot
be considered as such in a vertical paradigm, it can be considered once it
is translated into a vertical relation. This is the case where the Due Process Clause is used to account for the interests of other states.93 Subsumed
considerations are not necessarily less relevant than others. In effect,
ideas that are incompatible with a paradigm in their original form may,
after their subsumption, be protected just as well as, or even better than,
they would in a horizontal paradigm. But they are not protected in their
original form—they are protected as considerations that have been remolded to fit the paradigm.
Externalization involves the transposition of ideas that are incompatible with a certain paradigm out of the core institutions associated
with the paradigm. In a legal system with a vertical paradigm of jurisdiction, horizontal relations between courts and foreign states can be dealt
with by means other than those contained in the law of jurisdiction. For
example, the interests of other states can be addressed at the stage of
recognition and enforcement94 or through a political question doctrine.95
Those alternate methods are then functional equivalents of the law of
jurisdiction—they perform the same functions by different means.
Again, externalized considerations need not be less relevant for the legal
system as a whole.
Subsumption and externalization are by no means peripheral—they
are central to the internal consistency of paradigms. Any paradigm alone
must necessarily be incomplete. The relative consistency and reduction
of complexity a paradigm achieves come at the cost of its inability to
account, directly, for the inner frictions existing in any area of the law.
Subsumption and externalization are necessary ways to deal with these
frictions and complexities. Without them, a paradigm would not be viable, and its description would not be complete.
3. Paradigms and Comparative Law
In theory, it may be possible to find paradigms underlying a legal
system’s conception of jurisdiction by mere analysis of one legal system,
93.
94.
95.

Infra Part III.A.3.
Infra Part III.A.3.
Infra Part III.A.3.
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without regard to other systems. But it would be both insufficient and
unwise to do so. It would be insufficient because decisions on
international jurisdiction do not occur in isolation but rather in an interplay, willing or not, with the international jurisdiction exercised by
foreign courts. It would be unwise because comparison enables a dramatically better view of any legal system, especially because it typically
shows elements to be contingent that participants take to be essential.
Paradigms are frequently unstated, and participants in legal discourse are
frequently unaware of the boundaries set up by the paradigms within
which they think. One of the most important insights provided by
Kuhn’s study on paradigm shift96 was precisely that the inadequacies and
contingencies of a paradigm only become visible when a new paradigm
has replaced the earlier one. This external viewpoint that illuminates a
paradigm can be provided equally well through comparative law, as Clif97
ford Geertz has emphasized. The alternative paradigm, through which
these contingencies become visible, can come from a different legal system. The frequent observation that one cannot completely understand
one’s own law until one sees it through the eyes of a foreign legal system
is particularly apt in the study of paradigms.
A caveat is necessary. A paradigmatic account must be painted with
a broad brush. First, some details within each system must be neglected.
The aim is to draw an image that, if not complete, is at least accurate. It
is not to present each detail but rather to show how essential considerations appear in both paradigms, only in very different forms: as a
principle in one and as a mere reflex in the other; at the center of one and
externalized to another area of the law by the other. This is how functional equivalence and paradigmatic difference coexist. Second, this
Article largely ignores the existing opposition within each tradition to its
own paradigm. Kuhn’s point that paradigms often experience internal
frictions before a shift takes place98 applies to paradigms of jurisdiction
as well. Here, the emphasis lies on presentation of the paradigms as they
exist, but that does not imply that they are immutable, nor that they have
always characterized the law in the United States and in Europe. Third,
however, since paradigms can either subsume or externalize competing
considerations, they maintain a certain degree of stability against irritations. Further, this stability ensures that paradigms can maintain their
96.
Kuhn, supra note 85.
97.
Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge 167–234 (1983). For connections with
Kuhn, see Clifford Geertz, Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics 160–66 (2000). See also George Fletcher, Comparative Law as a
Subversive Discipline, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 683 (1998).
98.
Kuhn, supra note 85, at 84 (noting, however, that anomalies need not lead to paradigm shifts).

MICHAELS FTP3.DOC

1/2/2007 11:15 AM

Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction

Summer 2006]

1027

distinct structure over time. In this sense, paradigms are contingent but
not arbitrary—they are intrinsic to legal systems.

III. Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction
A difference in paradigms can be particularly beneficial in explaining the differences between U.S. and European laws of jurisdiction. The
99
U.S. paradigm, at least after International Shoe v. Washington, can be
called “in or out”—it is vertical, unilateral, domestic, and political. The
European paradigm can be labeled “us or them”—horizontal, multilateral, international, and apolitical. This implies the existence of various
interconnected dichotomies. The vertical/horizontal dichotomy describes
whether a legal system focuses on the vertical relation between the court
and the parties or on the horizontal relation between the forum state and
other states. The unilateral/multilateral dichotomy describes whether the
approach a legal system takes to issues of jurisdiction could potentially
apply without frictions for all other legal systems (multilateral), or
whether its focus is on its own relation to the case before it in disregard
of potential claims of other legal systems (unilateral). The domestic/international dichotomy is in many ways a combination of these two:
it describes whether a legal system regards jurisdictional issues as domestic or as interstate (international) in nature. The political/apolitical
dichotomy describes whether a legal system perceives a need to justify
politically the exercise of jurisdiction, or whether it thinks of jurisdiction
as an apolitical matter that can be justified otherwise.
A. “In or out”—The U.S. Paradigm of Jurisdiction
In order to test whether the debate over jurisdiction in the United
States can be explained with an “in or out” paradigm, I first present the
competing normative theories that have been offered for the law of jurisdiction before analyzing how well they fit under the paradigm, and how
competing considerations are either subsumed into, or externalized out
of, the paradigm.
1. American Thinking About Jurisdiction
Given how uneven the history of the law of jurisdiction has been in
the United States, can one really lump all approaches together within one
paradigm? A good starting point is the theoretical work performed in the
discipline. Arthur von Mehren identifies three kinds of theories of jurisdiction, which he draws from American law but believes to be applicable
99.

326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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to any contemporary legal order:100 relational theories, power theories,
and fairness theories.101 Relational theories focus on the relation of allegiance between a government and the individuals falling under its
102
jurisdiction as a consequence of this relation. Power theories see the
court’s power over the defendant as the basis of jurisdiction.103 Fairness
theories, ask whether it is fair, as between the parties, to submit the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court. Lea Brilmayer, using slightly
different terminology, identifies sovereignty theories, convenience theo104
ries, and power theories. Her convenience theory is similar to what von
Mehren calls a fairness theory; her sovereignty theory can be treated
here as structurally similar to von Mehren’s relational theory, and her
sovereignty theory is very close to von Mehren’s relational theory.
The power theory is famously encapsulated in Justice Holmes’ assertion that “[t]he foundation of jurisdiction is physical power . . . .”105 The
basis of the theory is the relationship of domination and submission between the court and the defendant. In ancient England, this meant actual
power. Jurisdiction was asserted over the defendant by physical arrest, to
ensure his presence at the trial. Since then, the assertion of power has
changed from actual to symbolic;106 the public and actual assertion of
power is now privatized107 and symbolized in service of process by the
plaintiff or her attorneys. Two decisions frequently explained with a
108
power theory are Pennoyer v. Neff and Burnham v. Superior Court of
109
California. Pennoyer established that service of process is necessary to
give a court power and therefore jurisdiction; Burnham made clear that
service of process is sufficient to give a court jurisdiction, because, at
least for traditional bases of jurisdiction like service, nothing beyond
power is necessary.
The second relevant set of theories are relational and sovereignty
theories. Although von Mehren suggests that relational theories of juris100.
Arthur T. von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and
Evaluated, 63 B.U. L. Rev. 279, 281–82 (1983).
101.
Id. at 283–4; von Mehren, supra note 10, at 31–36.
102.
von Mehren, supra note 100, at 283.
103.
Id. at 283, 285–87.
104.
Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws 268–75 (2d ed. 1995).
105.
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
106.
Cf. Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 Hastings L.J. 1613,
1615–1620 (2003) (arguing that when we talk of power we really mean legitimate authority).
107.
Cf. Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 689, 705–14 (1987) (discussing how due process shifted in
emphasis from public sovereign to private individual concerns).
108.
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
109.
495 U.S. 604 (1990).
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diction no longer exist in the real world,110 it is nevertheless fruitful to
scrutinize such theories with an eye to discerning their paradigmatic
framework. A relational theory gives jurisdiction to the courts of a sovereign if and because the defendant owes the sovereign allegiance. The
clearest example can be found in feudal relations, where the lord’s jurisdiction over his fee-holders is based on the feudal relation between the
two. Relational arguments still may explain some contemporary jurisdictional discourse in the United States. For example, although “doing
business” jurisdiction was historically based on the fiction of a corporation’s presence in a certain territory, the fact that it requires voluntary
conduct fits well with a fiction of consent. Jurisdiction is then based on
the relationship established through the defendant’s consent. Lea Brilmayer’s sovereignty theory of jurisdiction, in which jurisdiction as the
enforcement of sovereignty must be justified by some act of submission
to the sovereign, comes close to a relational theory of jurisdiction; the
necessary relation is no longer a feudal one but one of legitimate sovereignty.111
The third kind of theory of jurisdiction is the fairness or convenience
theory. Much of the U.S. Supreme Court case law in the twentieth century, starting with International Shoe,112 has been explained with such a
theory. The main focus of this kind of theory is not the power of the
court over the defendant, but rather whether it would be inconvenient for
her to defend herself in a forum she did not choose. The U.S. Supreme
Court formulated a two-prong test in International Shoe, relying on
minimum contacts and substantial fairness to the defendant; a third requirement of reasonableness was added later.113 Fairness theories focus
on the relationship between the litigants and the forum, as well as that
114
between the underlying controversy and the forum, but unlike relational theories, the question is one of fairness regardless of sovereignty
considerations.
110.
von Mehren, supra note 100, at 283; but see von Mehren, supra note 10, at 186–88
(discussing how Articles 14 and 15 of the French Code Civil can be explained with a relational
theory). Some authors have disputed the difference between allegiance and power theories; see
Paul Lagarde, Le Principe de Proximité dans le Droit International Privé Contemporain, 196
Recueil des Cours 9, 129 (1986); Thomas Pfeiffer, Internationale Zuständigkeit
und prozessuale Gerechtigkeit: die internationale Zuständigkeit im Zivilprozess
zwischen effektivem Rechtsschutz und nationaler Zuständigkeitspolitik 202 n.11
(1995). However, one important difference is that relation, unlike power, contains a voluntary
element.
111.
Brilmayer, supra note 104, at 269–70.
112.
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
113.
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1985). See also Burbank, supra note
14, at 747.
114.
von Mehren, supra note 10, at 288–90.
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It is necessary neither to decide which of these theories is normatively or descriptively the most attractive, nor to add to the numerous
analyses of the U.S. Supreme Court’s oscillation in the twentieth century
between a power and a fairness theory. Michael Solimine has plausibly
argued that the shifts in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence had limited
impact on actual decisions in lower courts.115 This supports the intuition
that the differences between the theories, though certainly real and considerable, are not paradigmatic; all theories exist within the same
paradigm.
2. A Vertical, Unilateral, Domestic, Political Paradigm
116

First, the focus of all these theories is vertical. Nearly all attention
goes to the vertical relation between the court and the defendant. The
power theory focuses on the power relation between court and defendant, both in its actual and its hypothetical form. Whether power is real,
as in old English law, or symbolic, as in modern U.S. law, matters little
in this regard. The relational theory and the sovereignty theory are different only insofar as they focus on the underlying legitimizing basis for
the assertion or jurisdiction rather than on sheer power. They are similar,
however, in that they also focus on the vertical relation between the court
and the parties; they both ask whether the assertion of jurisdiction by the
court is legitimate vis-à-vis the parties. The same is true for the convenience theory.
Fairness theories may not appear vertical at first sight, since they
seem to emphasize fairness in the horizontal relation between the parties
over the vertical relation between the court and the defendant. But in
their application, the real focus is again on the relation between the court
and the defendant and whether it is fair for the court, in this relation, to
assert jurisdiction over the defendant. A horizontal fairness theory focusing rigorously on the relations between the parties would have to
consider the plaintiff’s interests in litigating at the place of his choice
and weigh these interests against those of the defendant. Yet the fairness
theory, as applied by U.S. courts, rarely takes these competing interests
of plaintiffs into account.117 The decision in Keeton v. Hustler118 provides
an example: although the plaintiff had no connection to the forum and
115.
Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 Tul. L.
Rev. 1 (1998).
116.
See Lea Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Due Process and Political Theory, 26 U. Fla. L.
Rev. 293, 295–99 (1987).
117.
See Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limits on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 77, 111 (1980); Brilmayer, supra note 104, at 273; von Mehren,
supra note 10, at 191; see also infra, Parts IV.A, IV.B.
118.
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 770 (1984).
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had obviously engaged in forum shopping, the Court considered it sufficient for jurisdiction that the defendant had minimum contacts, even
though those were relatively insignificant as well. This obliviousness to
the relative interests of plaintiffs and defendants is easy to explain if the
fairness theory is conceived as a vertical one in which only the relationship between the court and the parties matters, and the relationship
between the parties is irrelevant.
Second, these theories are unilateral. They determine whether the
courts of a state have jurisdiction or not, regardless of whether the courts
of other states also have jurisdiction. For example, if the power theory
“never succeeded in producing exclusive jurisdiction,”119 this may be due
to the fact that the exclusion of foreign jurisdiction was never its aim in
the first place. In determining a state’s power over a defendant, it is
irrelevant whether other states have similar power. Similarly, a relational
test asks only whether a relationship between the court and the litigants
in the dispute exists, not whether this is the only or the most important
relation. A fairness test is also unilateral. At stake is whether it is fair for
a state to assert jurisdiction over the defendant, not whether it is fairer
for this state than for others to do so. Courts will ask whether it is
inconvenient for the defendant to defend herself, not whether it is more
inconvenient before this than before another forum. In fact, the fairness
test would not make sense otherwise because it is almost always more
convenient for a defendant to be sued in her home forum than elsewhere.
This unilateralism underlies even reformist literature. Paul Schiff
Berman’s important article on the globalization of jurisdiction120
convincingly discards many of the assumptions underlying current
thinking about jurisdiction, especially that of territoriality. Berman’s own
solution, however, remains squarely within a unilateral paradigm: each
community decides about its own jurisdiction in isolation from the
claims of others; “international” (or inter-community) considerations
only appear at the recognition stage when these communities must try to
convince other communities of their own jurisdiction.121 Even where
Berman argues that communities should exercise a “cosmopolitan” atti122
tude and defer to the jurisdictional claims of others, he does so on a
119.
Clermont, supra note 49, at 99–100.
120.
Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311
(2002).
121.
Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law and Globalization, 43 Colum. J.
Transnat’l L. 485, 533–38 (2005) (distinguishing between jurisdiction and jurispersuasion);
see also Ralf Michaels, The Re-Statement of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and
the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 53 Wayne L. Rev. 1199, 1212 (2006).
122.
Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1819, 1834–39, 1868–71
(2005).
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unilateral basis—he proposes a cosmopolitan community that transcends
the various communities that might assert jurisdiction123 and thereby
turns all multilateral issues into internal issues.
Third, all theories can be labeled domestic. This means that jurisdiction is a local issue, determined by the limits that national (or state) law
sets for its own courts. The question is whether the dispute brought to
the court lies within, or outside of, the state’s boundaries, inside or outside the state’s legal order. Unlike in an international paradigm, in a
domestic paradigm it is largely irrelevant whether the courts of other
states would more appropriately exercise jurisdiction. Matters of jurisdiction are domestic matters; foreign national interests are relevant only
insofar as they can be translated into such domestic matters.
All three types of jurisdictional theories can be shown to remain
within a domestic paradigm. The power theory and the relational/sovereignty theory are obviously most compatible with a domestic
paradigm; they ask whether the defendant or the dispute is within the
sovereign power of the court exercising jurisdiction. Though less obvious, the same is true for a fairness theory. Fairness, as a requirement of
jurisdiction, is fairness to the defendant, not fairness to other countries
and their competing claims to jurisdiction.
Again, this domestic paradigm can be discovered not only in case
law, but also in reformist literature, which does not transcend the paradigm. Berman’s main test for the adequacy of asserting jurisdiction—
whether a defendant is “a member” of the community that asserts jurisdiction124—provides one example. Another example is Evan Tsen Lee’s
recent proposal to view jurisdictional questions as similar to questions
on the merits, because both are about the legitimacy of a resulting judgment.125 Since questions on the merits are undoubtedly domestic matters
(provided domestic law applies), this proposal makes sense only if juris126
diction is likewise understood as domestic and the legitimacy question
underlying jurisdiction concerns the relation to domestic society rather
than to foreign courts.127
Fourth, U.S. jurisdictional theories are political. Jurisdiction in the
United States, since it focuses on the relationship between the parties
and the court, is a political issue. Since the exercise of jurisdiction is
123.
Id. at 486.
124.
Berman, supra note 120, at 487–88.
125.
Lee, supra note 106, at 1620. Lee’s point that even the power theory is really about
legitimacy can be found earlier, e.g. Brilmayer, supra note 104, at 296.
126.
Lee, supra note 106, at 1629.
127.
Id. at 1625–27. Lee considers the possibility that legitimacy of jurisdiction and
legitimacy of merits are conceptually different, but all the conceptual differences he considers—pedigree versus content—remain domestic.
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viewed along a vertical dimension as a public intrusion into the
defendant’s freedom, the individual has a negative right to be free from
state intervention unless this intervention is justified. This is why
justification for jurisdiction often occurs with reference to political
philosophers dealing with the justification for governmental authority, be
they Hobbes and Locke128 or Rawls, Hart, and Nozick.129 Since these
philosophers’ theories all focus on the vertical relation between
government and citizens, they translate well into jurisdiction; the court
represents the government and the defendant represents the governed.130
What the theories do not address are relations to other states. For example, a Lockean fairness theory of jurisdiction can explain jurisdiction
over non-citizens, but it has little space for horizontal relations with
other states’ courts.131 For Locke, the assertion of jurisdiction over foreigners was based on the foreigner’s implied submission, not on any
comity granted by the foreigner’s home state. In this sense, the political
justification remains domestic. The reason may be that, in matters of
private litigation, the respective interests of states in exercising jurisdiction are minimal;132 what matters politically is the power exercised over
the parties.
3. Subsumption and Externalization of
Competing Considerations
Of course, this is not the whole picture. No one can seriously say
that U.S. law focuses only on the relations between the court and the
defendant or the dispute and not at all on the relations to other states.
Relations to other states are considered within the due process test for
jurisdiction and they are considered through several other legal
mechanisms. However, these exceptions strengthen rather than weaken
the thesis that U.S. jurisdictional law remains in a vertical, unilateral,
domestic, political paradigm. When multilateral considerations become
relevant within the due process test, they are subsumed within the
domestic paradigm that the Due Process Clause encompasses. Further,
because the multilateral function of allocation between different states is
128.
See Roger H. Transgrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 849, 892–93 (1989); Richard B. Cappalli, Locke as the Key: A Unifying
and Coherent Theory of In Personam Jurisdiction, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 97, 101 (1992);
Brilmayer, supra note 116, at 276, 301, 306; von Mehren, supra note 10, at 31–33.
129.
Brilmayer, supra note 116, at 305, 307.
130.
Cappalli, supra note 128, at 101.
131.
von Mehren, supra note 10, at 35; Cf. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government II §§ 119–22 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press 1988) (1689) (justifying
jurisdiction over non-citizens with the non-citizens’ tacit consent).
132.
Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1112, 1132 (1981).
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externalized—fulfilled by other, functionally equivalent, institutions—
the law of jurisdiction can remain largely oblivious to these
considerations.
First, the Due Process Clause is also used for multilateral
considerations, especially for interstate cases in the context of
federalism. The reasonableness prong of the due process test emphasizes
“the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States
in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”133 The U.S.
Supreme Court appeared to think multilaterally when it pointed out, in
World-Wide Volkswagen, that “[t]he sovereignty of each State, in turn,
implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister States—a limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment.”134 The passage is frequently invoked in
support of an allocational theory of jurisdiction.
These considerations cannot be explained through reference to the
relationship between the court and the defendant, and have therefore
135
been criticized as irrelevant for the Due Process Clause. They represent
136
the horizontal relation between states. However, it is by no means irrelevant that the locus of these limitations is not the “scheme” of the
Constitution but ultimately “the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, which may sometimes act to divest the
State of its power to render a valid judgment.”137 Multilateral effects of
allocation of jurisdiction are not prime goals but mere reflective consequences of unilateral considerations. They are subsumed: “[t]he
restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual
liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause;”138 “[d]ue process
protects the sovereign interests of other states, but only incidentally.”139
Federalism is used as an argument that some restrictions on jurisdiction
133.
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987); Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
134.
444 U.S. at 293.
135.
See Redish, supra note 132; Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of “State Sovereignty” and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58
Notre Dame L. Rev. 699, 739–40 (1983).
136.
Weinstein, supra note 78, at 228.
137.
Id. at 294.
138.
Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
139.
Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal
Jurisdiction, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 689, 711 (1987); cf. Brilmayer, supra note 104, at 271 (“In
personal jurisdiction, it is the individual’s right to be left alone by a state that has no legitimate
authority over him or her that the due process clause protects.”).
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are necessary in a federal system, but the source for these restrictions is
the Due Process Clause.
It is of course true that multilateral considerations of federalism
were crucial for early American law on jurisdiction. But they were so in
a very peculiar way: in many of the old leading cases, for example
D’Arcy v. Ketchum,140 jurisdiction became relevant only indirectly, as a
requirement for enforcement under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.141 At
stake was not whether the assertion of jurisdiction itself by those courts
violated the Constitution, but rather whether a state had to give full faith
and credit to decisions rendered by the courts of another state without
jurisdiction. Restraints on jurisdiction were therefore only indirect.142
The same is true for specific restrictions of jurisdiction in individual
143
areas of the law—such as divorce, property, or penal law. Restrictions
on direct jurisdiction, by contrast, are not based on the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, where they would belong if they were primarily about
multilateral, allocational issues.144 Rather, they are based on the unilateral
Due Process Clause, where federalism issues become relevant only
implicitly.
That the “scheme” of the Constitution does not provide a proper
source for explicit multilateral considerations becomes even clearer in
view of case law on international cases. The U.S. Supreme Court uses
almost exactly the same approach for international cases that it has developed for domestic interstate cases, although constitutional limitations
derived from federalism should be irrelevant where a potential conflict
140.
52 U.S. 165 (1850).
141.
See Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction:
A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process
Clauses (Part One), 14 Creighton L. Rev. 499 (1981).
142.
Scoles et al., supra note 9. On the difference between direct and indirect jurisdiction, see Arthur Nussbaum, Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 221
(1941); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1601, 1610–36
(1968); Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments—General
Theory and the Role of Jurisdictional Requirements, in 167 Recueil des Cours 9 (1980);
Ralf Michaels, Some Jurisdictional Conceptions as Applied in Judgments Conventions, in
Conflict of Laws in a Globalizing World, supra note 46, part II.1, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=927484.
143.
Cf. Weinstein, supra note 78, at 225–26, 227 (finding a distinction between jurisdiction at the decision stage and at the recognition stage “inimical to a rational system of
interstate justice”). Such a distinction, although not always well recognized in the interstate
context, is crucial especially in the international context, in which different countries’ approaches to jurisdiction may differ widely. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1126–27 (1966).
See Weinstein, supra, note 78, at 258–64.
144.
Robert Abrams & Paul Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the Control of State Court Jurisdiction, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 75 (1984); Transgrud, supra note 128, at
880–84 (1989).
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of jurisdictions is with another country. Nonetheless, proposals to abolish or at least seriously restrict constitutional control of jurisdiction in
145
international settings have remained unheeded. The only possible conclusion is that the constitutional setting of allocation cannot be what
drives constitutional restrictions on jurisdiction.
Critics argue that the need to explain restrictions to jurisdiction with
reference to the protection of individual rights hampers the development
of principles addressing more specifically the concerns of federalism and
of interstate and international allocation of jurisdiction.146 They ask the
courts to base allocational federalist concerns in jurisdiction on other
foundations, either the general structure of the Constitution, federal
common law,147 or more detailed rules of state law.148 Such changes in the
law of jurisdiction are less urgent once it becomes clear that these considerations are already taken care of, albeit in different ways—they are
externalized from the law of in personam jurisdiction to other areas of
the law. Through externalization, the U.S. legal system can
simultaneously account for the necessities of multilateralism and yet
keep the law of jurisdiction free of them so its jurisdictional paradigm
remains internally consistent.
One kind of externalization takes place through the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.149 The private and public factors in the forum non
conveniens test are so similar to those in the due process test that some
have questioned the necessity of two separate tests.150 But forum non
conveniens differs from due process in one important respect: it requires
151
a comparison of the relative convenience of several available fora. A
145.
Andrew L. Strauss, Where America Ends and the International Order Begins: Interpreting the Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Constitution in Light of a Proposed Hague
Convention on Jurisdiction and Satisfaction of Judgments, 61 Alb. L. Rev. 1237 (1998);
Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and “Purposeful Availment”: A Reassessment of Fifth
Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 455 (2004); see also Austen
L. Parrish, Sovereignty, not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1, 56–59 (2006) (suggesting abolishing constitutional
constraints on personal jurisdiction over aliens and replacing them with constraints from comity).
146.
Weinstein, supra note 78, at 270–76.
147.
See generally Weinstein, supra note 78; Whitten, supra note 141.
148.
Clermont, supra note 49, at 110–12.
149.
Under this doctrine, a court can decide not to exercise jurisdiction if it finds itself to
be an inappropriate forum and if there is a clearly more appropriate forum elsewhere.
150.
Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 781 (1985); Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A
Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1259 (1987); Kevin M. Clermont, Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue 43 (1999); see also Chase, Law, Culture, and Ritual,
supra note 52, at 80.
151.
Scoles et al., supra note 9, at 493–94. Given how insufficient the analysis of an
alternative forum often is, and how rarely suits are brought again at an alternative forum after
a forum non conveniens dismissal, one could argue that not even forum non conveniens in U.S.
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court will declare itself a forum non conveniens only if another forum is
both available and clearly more appropriate. Functionally, the doctrine of
forum non conveniens can be viewed as a jurisdictional device; to
determine whether a court should hear a case or not is at its heart a
decision about jurisdiction and its exercise. It is therefore significant
that, doctrinally, forum non conveniens is a matter different from
jurisdiction.152 Dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens is
available only if a court otherwise has jurisdiction;153 it is a matter of
discretion and does not create res judicata. By externalizing multilateral
considerations to a doctrine outside of jurisdiction, the U.S. law of
jurisdiction can maintain its unilateral posture.154 Whether the alternative
forum provides a real alternative for the plaintiff is not an issue
American courts address in detail, and few cases dismissed with regard
to another forum are later brought at that forum.155 But this only suggests
that the foreign forum is less attractive than the one where the suit was
first brought; it does not suggest that multilateral considerations are not
taken seriously.156
A second externalization of multilateral consideration takes place
through the foreign affairs power. In Asahi Metal v. Superior Court of
California, the Supreme Court invoked “the federal interest in Government’s foreign relations policies” as a relevant consideration when
asking whether exercising jurisdiction would be reasonable.157 International concerns are therefore present in the analysis. At the same time,
however, deference in multilateral issues to the executive branch ensures
that the Court remains in a domestic, not international, paradigm. The
issue is addressed not as one of allocation of power between one country
law is not a truly multilateral doctrine. In an unpublished empirical study, Christopher A.
Whytock finds that in his sample of cases since 1990, in an estimated forty-one percent of
forum non conveniens cases, including eighteen percent of forum non conveniens dismissals,
the court engaged in no adequate alternative forum analysis. However, the fact that courts do
not perform their multilateral tasks well has no impact on the fact that this task is multilateral.
152.
For English law, see Fentiman, supra note 25, at 86.
153.
This proposition is accurate, at least according to Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501, 504 (1947). The U.S. Supreme Court will review this question in Sinochem Int’l Co.
Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., No. 06-102.
154.
By dismissing a case on condition or stipulation, a court can try to guarantee that
the more appropriate forum will hear the case and thereby reach an effect very similar to that
of transfer. In the majority of cases, however, an action dismissed by one forum under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens is not brought again before another court. For empirical
data, see D. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: “A Rather Fantastic
Fiction”, 103 L.Q. Rev. 398, 419 (1987).
155.
Burbank, supra note 24, at 242–43; Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal
Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 309, 346–48 (2002).
156.
See Russell W. Weintraub, Response to Professor Robertson, 29 Tex. Int’l L.J.
381, 381 (1994); see also supra note 154.
157.
480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987).
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and another (as it would be in an international paradigm), but rather as
one of allocation of power between the judiciary and the executive. International considerations are for the government; domestic
considerations remain with the courts.
Finally, a third important externalization involves the law of
recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions. In the interstate
system, horizontal considerations can be ignored at the stage of
jurisdiction because they become relevant at the stage of recognition. It
is significant in this regard that, apart from fraud, lack of jurisdiction in
the rendering court is the only relevant exception to the constitutional
requirement to give full faith and credit to other states’ judgments.158
Likewise, in the international realm, foreign nation judgments are denied
recognition for lack of jurisdiction of the rendering court, which includes
not only jurisdiction under that court’s own law, but also (and more
importantly for purposes of this Article) lack of jurisdiction under U.S.
due process standards.159 In fact, the requirements for recognition
purposes can be even stricter than those proposed for jurisdiction of U.S.
160
courts. Although this is an imperfect substitute for restricting
jurisdiction at the time of the first decision (because a non-recognizable
decision remains enforceable in the country where it was rendered), for a
unilateral paradigm it has the advantage that multilateral considerations
come into play at the moment when the judgment’s effects become
multilateral, because the judgment is taken into another state for
recognition purposes. Considering multilateral issues of jurisdiction at
the recognition stage makes it easier to neglect multilateral
considerations at the decision stage.
B. “Us or Them”—The European Paradigm of Jurisdiction
European thinking about jurisdiction is strikingly different. This can
be said as a general statement, even though European countries have dif158.
See discussion in Scoles et al., supra note 9, at 1284–88. Cf. Weintraub, supra
note 14, at 123 (“The defendant can make this attack [of lack of jurisdiction] either in the state
in which the judgment has been rendered or in a sister state.”); see id. at 123–24 for the different situation under EU law, where a collateral effect is not possible.
159.
See the references in Gary B. Born, International Civil Litigation in
United States Courts 969–71 (3d ed. 1996); Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute—Proposed Final Draft § 6, at 14 (April
11, 2005) [hereinafter ALI Judgments Statute]. For analysis, see Michaels, supra note 142;
Conflict of Laws in a Globalizing World: A Tribute to Arthur von Mehren,
(Eckart Gottschalk, Ralf Michaels, Giesela Rühl & Jan von Hein eds., forthcoming 2007).
160.
See ALI Judgments Statute, supra note 159, at 85, 87.
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ferent laws of jurisdiction.161 European legislation, notably the Brussels
Regulation, brought a unified law of jurisdiction within Europe and a
somewhat unified theory, but only to a limited degree. Nonetheless, the
Brussels Regulation can be considered representative of European law
for two reasons. First, it incorporates and therefore represents much jurisdictional thinking from the member states. Second, in its focus on
relations between member states, rather than relations to third countries,
it is most comparable to U.S. law, which developed largely in an interstate setting. Of course, national laws on jurisdiction remain important,
as inspiration for the Brussels Regime and as representations of European thinking.
1. European Thinking About Jurisdiction
Any comparison of American and European thinking about jurisdiction faces an immediate problem: European jurisdictional thinking was
for a long time less theoretical than American thinking.162 One could
therefore attempt simply to use the triad of theories developed in the
American context, relational/sovereignty, power, and interest theories, on
European law as well. To some extent, relational theories can be used to
explain jurisdiction based on domicile and habitual residence, as in Article 2 of the Brussels Regulation, and jurisdiction based on nationality, as
in Articles 14 and 15 of the French Code Civil, which give jurisdiction to
French courts based on the French nationality of the plaintiff or the defendant.163 Power and sovereignty theories seem even more appropriate
to explain these French bases: jurisdiction is based on the sovereign
164
power of the French nation-state over its citizens. Power has also been
used to explain Article 23 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, which
gives courts general jurisdiction based on the presence of assets of the
defendant.165 Fairness and convenience theories can go a long way
161.
English law, with its common law tradition, differs fundamentally from continental
law; in many (though not all) regards, it is closer to the U.S. paradigm than the European
paradigm.
162.
For the German approach, see von Mehren, supra note 10, at 143. This relative lack
of theoretical accounts is in accordance with the apolitical character this Article claims for the
European paradigm; infra Part III.B.2. Where the assertion of jurisdiction is largely viewed as
a neutral and technical matter, theories for its justification are unnecessary.
163.
For such an explanation, see id. at 186–88; for an analysis of Article 14 of the Code
Civil from a U.S. perspective, see Clermont & Palmer, supra note 20; for a pertinent decision
affecting a U.S. party, see Cass. Civ., Mar. 30, 2004, supra note 67 (rejecting enforcement of a
U.S. judgment against a French woman who had not waived her privilege under Code Civil
Article 14 to be sued only in France).
164.
Étienne Pataut, Principe de Souveraineté et Conflits de Jurisdictions
(Étude de Droit International Privé) 95 (1999).
165.
Rudolf Waizenegger, Der Gerichtsstand des § 23 ZPO und seine gesetzliche Entwicklung 100–01 (1915); Pfeiffer, supra, note 110, at 204; but cf. von Mehren,
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towards explaining many bases of specific jurisdiction. Especially in
Germany, there has long been a focus on private interests as factors in
166
designating competent fora; scholars and courts also emphasize private
interests at work in the Brussels Regulation.167
Yet, Europeans rarely use these American theories,168 and indeed
they do not accurately explain European law. First, there is a difference
in emphasis. American comparatists, applying the theories to European
jurisdictional law, often focus on provisions that may look central
through the lens of the theories but appear peripheral to European analysts and practice. For example, although Article 23 of the German Code
of Procedure is a regular focus of American analysis (and outrage), the
provision plays a relatively modest role in German jurisdictional practice;169 the same is true for Articles 14 and 15 of the French Code Civil.170
Second, none of the theories can adequately explain current European
law. In particular, the principle that plaintiffs normally seek out defendants, which is central to European jurisdictional thinking171 and codified
in Article 2 of the Brussels Regulation, cannot be explained by any of
172
these theories, as von Mehren has shown. Relational theories could
focus on plaintiffs or defendants equally well, as the French Code Civil
makes clear: Article 14 gives jurisdiction to French plaintiffs, and Article
supra note 10, at 145 n.377 (“Section 23 is less consistent than its pre-1871 precursors with a
power theory.”).
166.
See Andreas Heldrich, Internationale Zuständigkeit und Anwendbares
Recht 102–31 (1969); Jochen Schröder, Internationale Zuständigkeit: Entwurf
eines
Systems
von
Zuständigkeitsinteressen
im
zwischenstaatlichen
Privatverfahrensrecht aufgrund rechsthistorischer, rechtsvergleichender und
rechtspolitischer Betrachtungen 112–485 (1971) (extensive comparative and historical
analysis); Haimo Schack, Internationales Zivilverfahrensrecht: ein Studienbuch
93–94, nos. 200–04 (3d ed. 2002).
167.
Infra Parts IV.A, IV.D.
168.
Exceptions are usually influenced by U.S. law. See, e.g., Pfeiffer, supra note 110,
at 200–13; Till U. Kleinstück, Due Process-Beschränkungen des Vermögensgerichtsstandes durch hinreichenden Inlandsbezug und Minimum Contacts 166–88
(1994).
169.
Contra Pfeiffer, supra note 110, at 8 (“Since the legislator created this provision
with a view to cases with international focus, it is of exemplary relevance for the whole law of
jurisdiction.”) (Ralf Michaels trans.). The opposite seems more plausible: since the provision
was conceived as an exception to the analogous application of venue provisions for matters of
jurisdiction, Article 23 cannot be considered representative. Moreover, Pfeiffer’s own conclusion that Article 23 violates the German Constitution, id. at 620–23, reinforces its exceptional
character.
170.
See Clermont & Palmer, supra note 20, at 492 (“In fact, Article 14 appears not to be
regularly invoked in practice.”).
171.
Supra note 87.
172.
von Mehren, supra note 10, at 185–91; Arthur T. von Mehren, Must Plaintiffs Seek
Out Defendants? The Contemporary Standing of Actor Sequitur Forum Rei, 8 King’s Coll.
L.J. 23 (1997–98); see also Benedikt Buchner, Kläger- und Beklagtenschutz im
Recht der internationalen Zuständigkeit passim (1998).
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15 gives jurisdiction over French defendants. Each provision rests on
relational considerations; there is no intrinsic reason why a relational
173
theory should focus only on defendants. Similarly, power theories do
not systematically favor defendants’ fora; they can justify the existence
of a number of different courts with jurisdiction.174 Fairness theories, finally, cannot explain why defendants should be preferred over
175
plaintiffs. That none of these theories can explain a central element of
European jurisdictional thinking suggests that they are inadequate.
Moreover, given that these theories furnish all the reasonable answers
that have been advanced in response to the fundamental question of jurisdiction as understood in the United States—when is it appropriate visà-vis the defendant for a court to exercise jurisdiction over him—it is
plausible that the questions to which European law responds differ altogether from those posed in the United States.
Europeans do indeed ask different questions. To understand how different, it is instructive to look at the roots of German jurisdictional law
as one important source of European jurisdictional thinking.176 In Germany, the law of jurisdiction—internationale Zuständigkeit
(international competence)—was derived from the law of venue—
örtliche Zuständigkeit (local competence).177 For a long time, the highest
German court, the Reichsgericht, did not even distinguish between these
178
forms of competence, but rather treated them both as issues of venue.
A differentiation between international jurisdiction and venue developed
only slowly; still today most rules on international jurisdiction are derived from the rules on venue. Significantly, the author of one of the
official reports on the Brussels Convention speaks of “international
venue”—because calling them provisions of jurisdiction would falsely
suggest similarity to American ideas of jurisdiction—and points out that
173.
von Mehren, supra note 10, at 188.
174.
See id. at 189; see also Schlosser, supra note 17, at 19 (“Justice Holmes’ ‘power
concept’ as the basis of jurisdiction is alien to civil-law systems.”) (internal reference omitted).
175.
See von Mehren, supra note 10, at 191 (citing Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945)). Note that this Article, in focusing on paradigms, is concerned with jurisdictional
thinking rather than practical results; supra Part C.1. Whether in practice most suits must be
brought at the defendant’s forum is a different question; for this question, see von Mehren,
supra note 10, at 191–94.
176.
French law, which once focused more on sovereignty concerns, has moved closer to
this German model as well. See Hubert Bauer, Compétence Judiciaire Internationale
des Tribunaux Civils Français et Allemands passim (1965).
177.
See Pfeiffer, supra note 110, at 73–77; Peter L. Murray & Rolf Stürner,
German Civil Justice (2004).
178.
E.g. 8 Otto Warneyer, Die Rechtsprechung des Reichsgerichts, No. 247, at
376–77 (1915) (“There is no intrinsic reason to distinguish between the case in which the
venue of a foreign court besides that of a German court is at stake and the case in which the
choice must be struck between German courts.”) (Ralf Michaels trans.).
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Europeans do not typically distinguish between jurisdiction and international venue.179 As a consequence, considerations on jurisdiction are
largely similar to those for venue. In fact, although Americans have also
suggested such a similarity, a comparison with American proposals to
merge jurisdiction and venue reveals the degree of difference between
jurisdiction in Germany and jurisdiction in the United States: while some
Americans are willing to treat venue like jurisdiction,180 Europeans
would rather treat jurisdiction like venue. Jurisdiction in the American
sense has an altogether different doctrinal counterpart in German law,
Gerichtsbarkeit. Gerichtsbarkeit, the origin of which is in international
rather than national law, defines the outer limits of the power of one
country’s courts and is separate from international venue.181 Gerichtsbarkeit concerns mainly questions of immunity, and its practical
importance beyond this is not nearly as great as that of jurisdiction in the
United States.182
This foundation of jurisdiction in venue is overlooked by American
(and German) comparatists who consider only those provisions in German law most amenable to their own paradigm. For example, Article 23
of the German Code of Civil Procedure (quasi in rem jurisdiction) stands
out because it deals explicitly with international cases, but its role within
German law of jurisdiction is by no means prominent.183
The Brussels Regulation, not surprisingly, continues in many ways
the approaches found in the jurisdictional systems of the EU member
states.184 In this way, it can be called a civil law instrument,185 although
here, as in other areas of the law, the distinction between civil law and
common law is too abstract to be very helpful.186 Significantly, in the
179.
Schlosser, supra note 17, at 19–20. See Nussbaum, supra note 142, at 221–22.
180.
Spencer Weber Waller, A Unified Theory of Transnational Procedure, 26 Cornell
Int’l L.J. 101 (1993); see also Clermont, supra note 14, at 27–29.
181.
See, e.g., Schack, supra note 166, at 64–80; the foundational article is Max
Pagenstecher, Gerichtsbarkeit und interationale Zuständigkeit als selbständige
Prozeßvoraussetzungen, 11 RabelsZ 337 (1937). See also Robert Neuner, Internationale Zuständigkeit (1929).
182.
But see Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) (federal constitutional court) Feb 16,
2006, 2 BvR 1476/03, 59 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2542 (2006) (denying
enforcement for lack of Gerichtsbarkeit to a Greek judgment on reparation claims by Greek
victims resulting from the German occupation of Crete in World War II); Markus Rau, State
Liability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law—The Distomo Case Before the
German Federal Constitutional Court, 7 German L.J. 701, 705–07 (2006).
183.
Contra Pfeiffer, supra note 110, at 8.
184.
See Schlosser, supra note 17, at 30.
185.
Anna Gardella & Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Civil Law, Common Law and Market Integration: The EC Approach to Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 611, 612–16
(2003).
186.
See David A.O. Edward, The Role and Relevance of the Civil Law Tradition in the
Work of the European Court of Justice, in The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law 309,
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Regulation’s predecessor, the 1968 Brussels Convention, the term “jurisdiction” was not used in any of the official languages;187 it only appeared
in the later English version when the United Kingdom joined in 1979.
Indeed, the concept of jurisdiction in the Brussels Regulation is more
similar to the German law of venue than to jurisdiction in the American
188
sense. Notably, most provisions of the Regulation simultaneously regulate venue within the member states189—as in Germany, venue and
jurisdiction are not distinguished. On the other hand, jurisdiction in the
sense of Gerichtsbarkeit is left outside the scope of the Regulation altogether.190
The main objective of both German law and the Brussels Regulation
is not to protect defendants but rather to allocate jurisdiction to the most
appropriate member state, regardless of sovereignty interests of the
member states. Defendants domiciled in a member state can always be
sued in their home states (Article 2), and there are specific grounds for
jurisdiction in Articles 5 et seq. Importantly, each of these specific provisions determines only one relevant factor and therefore renders only one
state’s courts competent. For example, specific jurisdiction for contracts
could, in theory, lie at the place where the contract is made, the place
where the contract is performed, or both. Yet, whereas under U.S. law
this means that both places can in fact claim specific jurisdiction,191
European law searches for one and only one connecting factor for each
legal category; in the case of contracts, this is the place of performance
(Article 5(1)).192 The only exception is jurisdiction over torts, which lies
311–15 (David L. Carey Miller & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 1997) (denying a specific civil
law influence on the European Court of Justice case law regarding the Brussels Convention).
187.
The original text was passed in four official languages, none of which used the term
jurisdiction or its foreign language equivalent: German (Zuständigkeit), French (compétence
judiciaire), Italian (competenza giurisdizionale), and Dutch (rechterlijke bevoegdheid). The
German president of the expert group that developed the Convention unsuccessfully proposed
the term Jurisdiktion: Arthur Bülow, Vereinheitlichtes Internationales Zivilprozessrecht in der
Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 29 RabelsZ 473, 478 n. 15 (1965); see also
Reinhold Geimer, Zur Prüfung der Gerichtsbarkeit und der internationalen
Zuständigkeit bei der Anerkennung ausländischer Urteile 71 (1966).
188.
Jan Kropholler, Internationale Zuständigkeit, in I Handbuch des Internationalen Zivilverfahrensrechts 197 (Tübingen, Mohr, 1982).
189.
Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 5, 6 [hereinafter Jenard Report]; Report on
the Convention on the Association of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and to the Protocol on its Interpretation by the Court of Justice, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 71, para. 70 [hereinafter Schlosser Report].
190.
Jan Kropholler, Europäisches Zivilprozeßrecht, art. 2, no. 4, at 95 (8th ed.
2005).
191.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985); Scoles et al., supra
note 9, at 389 (“no single factor can be dispositive”).
192.
See Case C-256/00, Besix v. WABAG, 2002 E.C.R. I-1699, paras. 29, 32.
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both at the place of conduct and at the place of injury,193 but this is a matter of interpretation of “place of the tort,” not an endorsement of
alternative factors.
In contrast to U.S. law, the Brussels Regulation distinguishes between intra-Community cases and cases involving contacts with nonmember states. Its provisions apply to plaintiffs from non-member
states194 but not normally to defendants from non-member states;195
against the latter, national provisions on jurisdiction remain applicable.
Given how important this restriction is, and how heavily it has been
criticized in the United States,196 it is surprising to see how little thought
was apparently given to it when the Convention was drafted.197 The
original reason for the restriction lay in the limited competence of the
198
EU at the time; now that this argument has lost some of its force, contemporary scholars are widely critical of the restriction.199 The main
justification given today is the pressure the restriction places on foreign
countries like the United States to compromise on their own wide claims
to jurisdiction or ensure enforcement of European decisions.200 That
Europeans consider the Regulation a good model for a worldwide con193.
Case 21/76, Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier BV v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA, 1976
E.C.R. 1735; Case C- 51/97, Réunion Européenne SA v. Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV,
1998 E.C.R. I-6513.
194.
Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Co. SA v. Universal Gen. Ins. Co., 2000
E.C.R. I-5925.
195.
E.g., Case C-318/93, Brenner v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 1994 E.C.R. I-4275.
For a general analysis, see George Berman & Bernard Audit, The Application of Private International Norms to “Third Countries”: The Jurisdiction and Judgments Example, in
International Civil Litigation in Europe and Relations With Third States, supra
note 25, at 65–68.
196.
See Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Sister-State Judgments:
Reflections on General Theory and Current Practice in the European Economic Community
and the United States, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1044, 1058–59 (1981) (directly juxtaposing the
nondiscriminatory Due Process Clause in the United States and the discriminatory provision
in Article 3 of the Brussels I regime); see also Kurt H. Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper
Fora in Treaties on Recognition of Judgments: The Common Market Draft, 67 Colum. L. Rev.
995 (1967); see also Friedrich Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the
European Communities: A Comparison, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1195, 1211–12 (1984); for due
process concerns, see Ronald A. Brand, Hague Judgments Convention, supra note 19, at 696–
701.
197.
See the very brief remarks by Bülow, supra note 187, at 482–83; see also Martha
Weser, Convention communautaire sur la competence judiciare et l’exécution des
décisions 274–77 (1975).
198.
Georges Droz, Compétence judiciaire et effets des jugements dans le
marché commun (1972).
199.
E.g., Kropholler, supra note 190, art. 4, para. 1, at 107; Pascal Grolimund,
Drittstaatenproblematik des europäischen Zivilverfahrensrechts 273–74 (2000).
200.
Reinhold Geimer, Internationales Zivilprozeßrecht § 1383, at 436 (4th ed.
2001); Schack, supra note 166, at 46, no. 103.
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vention201 shows they do not regard its content as unique to intraCommunity relations, just as the constitutional law of jurisdiction in the
United States is not considered unique to intrastate relations.
2. A Horizontal, Multilateral, International, Apolitical Paradigm
Underlying both European practice and theory of jurisdiction is a
paradigm very different from that in the United States. First, this paradigm is horizontal. European jurisdictional thinking focuses on the
horizontal relations between countries rather than on the vertical relation
between the court and the parties. This peculiarity is touched on, but not
really captured, when comparatists argue that Europeans care less about
contacts to the defendant and more about contacts to the controversy.
This latter distinction, one of degree rather than of paradigm, does not
explain well general jurisdiction in Europe at the defendant’s domicile
202
regardless of the controversy. It seems similarly inadequate in explaining specific jurisdiction in U.S. law, which requires a close connection
203
between the forum and the controversy. Rather, the real question of
jurisdiction in Europe is neither whether there are sufficient vertical contacts between the defendant and the country whose courts are seized, nor
whether such contacts exist between that country and the controversy.
The real question is which of several states’ courts are the most appropriate to deal with a type of litigation. Jurisdiction is justified vis-à-vis
other states with a plausible claim to jurisdiction, not vis-à-vis the defendant and her interest in protection from the court.
Second, jurisdictional thinking in the European tradition is multilateral. Of course, jurisdictional rules outside of conventions are
necessarily unilateral in effect in the sense that a court can only determine whether it has jurisdiction or not; it cannot designate a foreign
court as competent.204 Even in national laws, however, jurisdiction is
201.
Schlosser supra note 17, at 10 (“From the outset, there was a common understanding that the system of the Brussels Convention must be the starting point . . . .”); Schack,
supra note 166. For American criticism, see Arthur T. von Mehren, The Hague Jurisdiction
and Enforcement Convention Project Faces an Impasse—A Diagnosis and Guidelines for a
Cure, 20 Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts [IPRax] 465
(2000); Arthur T. von Mehren & Ralf Michaels, Pragmatismus und Realismus für die Haager
Verhandlungen zu einem weltweiten Gerichtsstands- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommen, 25
DAJV-Newsletter 124, 126 (2000) (F.R.G.); see also Conclusions of the second Special
Commission meeting on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and
commercial matters, in Proceedings of the Eighteenth Session, supra note 33, at 185.
202.
See Haimo Schack, Germany, in Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law 189, 194 (J.J. Fawcett ed., 1995).
203.
For an explanation of the concept of specific jurisdiction, see von Mehren, supra
note 142, at 64–65.
204.
This represents a difference from choice of law, where foreign law can be applied.
Unlike jurisdictional rules, choice of law rules can be truly multilateral if they use the same
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allocated according to principles that are at least potentially universal.
For German law, this is a natural consequence of its roots in the law of
venue: venue rules must be universal because they allocate venue to one
of several courts; extension of these principles is therefore also universal
at least in attitude. But the connection is not confined to Germany. Authors in the French tradition also claim a multilateral character for their
laws of jurisdiction. The use of universal connecting factors implies that
if the factor (e.g. the defendant’s domicile) lies outside the state, the state
does not have jurisdiction.205 In this view, jurisdiction cannot be denied
for any reason other than that another more appropriate forum has jurisdiction.206
The multilateral character of jurisdiction in Europe becomes clear
once we realize that the criterion for jurisdiction is not a close connection, as in U.S. law, but rather the closest connection in an abstractly
defined category like tort and according to an abstractly defined connecting factor like “place of the tort.” Determining the closest connection
requires a horizontal comparison between the connections that different
countries have with the parties or the dispute. Consequently, the main
criterion is not the vertical relation between the state and the defendant
but rather the horizontal relation between the court’s own state and other
states, not fairness towards the defendant but appropriateness vis-à-vis
other countries’ claims of jurisdiction. Of course, different bases of jurisdiction are available at the same time, and no decision is made
regarding which of them constitutes the closest connection. In a contracts case, for example, the plaintiff can sue the defendant both in the
defendant’s home country207 and at the place of performance.208 Forum
shopping is possible in Europe, too, and although it is sometimes
209
frowned upon, lawyers recognize that it is both unavoidable and unobjectionable in principle.210 The point is that only one place of jurisdiction
is sought within each category.
factors for the application of forum law and of foreign law. See Jan Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht 565 (4th ed. 2001).
205.
Weser, supra note 197, at 36–38.
206.
Id. at 38.
207.
Brussels I, supra note 18, art. 2; ZPO, supra note 21, art. 13.
208.
Brussels I, supra note 18, art. 5(1); ZPO, supra note 21, art. 29.
209.
See Case C-334/00, Fonderie Officine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v. Heinrich Wagner
Sinto Maschinenfabrik GmbH, 2002 E.C.R. I-7357, Op. Advocate Gen. Geelhoed para. 32.
(Jan. 31, 2001); see also Case C-168/02, Kronhofer v. Maier, 2004 E.C.R. I-6009, Op. Advocate Gen. Léger paras. 34, 50 (Jan. 14, 2004).
210.
Case C-1/04, Staubitz-Schreiber, 2005 E.C.R. I-701, Op. Advocate Gen. RuizJarabo Colomer para. 71 (Sept. 6, 2005); Case C-343/04, Land Oberösterreich v. ČEZ, 2006
E.C.R. 1-4557, Op. Advocate Gen. Poiares Maduro para. 85 (Jan. 11, 2006); Schack, supra
note 166, at 100, no. 222. In fact, the EU Commission itself engages in forum shopping when
it sues tobacco companies before U.S. courts in the hope of getting treble damages under
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Third, European jurisdictional thinking is international. While the
question in a domestic paradigm was whether the dispute or the parties
are “in or out” of the jurisdiction, here the jurisdictional question is
whether it is for “us or them” to exercise jurisdiction.” “International”
does not refer to the character of the Brussels Regulation as an international treaty211 or to the fact that the Regulation still applies
internationally to several nation states. Rather, “international” signifies
that what matters is the relation between nations. Jurisdiction can be
based on a hypothetical common understanding between countries, a
matter of international law. Jurisdictional rules are, at least potentially,
universal. There is an obvious parallel to choice of law in a Savignyan
tradition, which seeks the “seat” of a legal relationship on the basis of an
international community of states.212
Finally, the European paradigm is apolitical. Matters of private litigation are considered apolitical; the state’s only task is to provide a
forum. The right of access to court flows from the plaintiff’s private right
against the defendant.213 The defendant’s freedom from state intervention
is irrelevant because the suit is considered a private matter. As a consequence, political theory is rarely used to justify jurisdiction; the relation
between the court and the defendant is not generally emphasized.214 Political theory could appear relevant in the form of international relations
215
theory, but it is largely absent from European debates. The reason is
that although the focus of jurisdiction is international, its goal is the correct adjudication of relations between the parties, where state interests
are thought to be largely absent.216 Just as private law is considered less
RICO. See Case C-131/03, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc. v. Commission, 2006 WL
2593840, Celex No. 603J0131 (Sept. 12, 2006); for the U.S. side of the litigation, see European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175, cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1045 (2006).
211.
While the Brussels Convention was an international treaty, the Brussels Regulation
is a legislative instrument of the European Community.
212.
For the seat principle, see Ralf Michaels, Globalizing Savigny? The State in Savigny’s Private International Law and the Challenge of Europeanization and Globalization, in
Dezentralisierung. Aktuelle Fragen politischer und rechtlicher Steuerung im
Kontext der Globalisierung (Michael Stolleis & Wolfgang Streeck eds., forthcoming
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=796228.
213.
But see John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process
and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 Yale L.J. 524 (2005).
214.
For exceptions, see supra note 168.
215.
For a comparative analysis using international relations theory, see Samuel P.
Baumgartner, Is Transnational Litigation Different?, 25 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 1297 (2004).
216.
This may explain why parties can waive the defense of lack of in personam jurisdiction under Brussels I (Art. 24), unlike lack of subject matter jurisdiction under U.S. law
(Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 (2006)).
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political in Europe than in the United States,217 so adjudicatory jurisdiction in private law matters is considered apolitical. The goal is to achieve
the most appropriate forum and to protect the defendant against the
plaintiff, but justifications are usually framed in terms of justice or general interest analysis, not politics. This may strike some as naïve.
Obviously, the decision to treat the law of jurisdiction as a private law
matter and thereby separate it from political discourse is itself a politically relevant decision. However, although this decision may well be
political, allocation itself is not made on the basis of political considerations, but rather in an apolitical manner.
3. Subsumption and Externalization of Competing Considerations
An obvious objection to the analysis so far mirrors the objection to
the analysis of U.S. jurisdiction above. There, the question was whether
one could really say that U.S. law of jurisdiction does not deal with
allocational concerns in a multilateral fashion. Here, the question is
whether one can really say that European law of jurisdiction ignores
vertical relations between the court and the defendant. The answer also
mirrors the answer given above: such considerations are important in
Europe (though maybe less so than multilateral considerations are
relevant in American thought), but they are either subsumed into a
horizontal approach or externalized to other institutions.
First, subsumption: common law practitioners sometimes argue that
the common law cares more about justice for the parties, while the civil
218
law cares more about relations between states. In part, this reading is
compatible with the paradigmatic difference developed in this Article.
The civil law, as embodied in European thinking about jurisdiction, is
international in the sense that it emphasizes relations between countries.
The common law, as embodied particularly in U.S. thinking about jurisdiction, is vertical in the sense that it emphasizes individual rights. This
reading is flawed, however, if it insinuates that only the common law
cares about justice for the parties.219 The truth is more complex: both
paradigms prize justice, but they do so in different ways. Contrary to
217.
Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels, Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization,
Globalization, Privatization Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 Am. J. Comp. L.
(forthcoming 2007).
218.
Peter B. Carter, Anti-Suit Injunctions in Private International Law, 368 Vorträge,
Reden und Berichte aus dem Europa-Institut Sektion Rechtswissenschaft 13 (1997),
available at http://europainstitut.de/euin/schrift/download/368.pdf; Hartley, supra note 23, at
814–15; Trevor C. Hartley, How to Abuse the System and (Maybe) Come Out on Top: Bad-Faith
Proceedings Under the Brussels Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, in Law and Justice in
a Multistate World—Essays in Honor of Arthur T. von Mehren, supra note 46, at 81.
219.
It is equally flawed if it insinuates that only the civil law cares about relations with
other states or countries; see supra Part III.A.3.
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frequent misperceptions, fairness is by no means unimportant in
European jurisdictional thought. While in U.S. law, the protection of defendants is usually not addressed as a problem in their relation to the
court,220 in Europe this protection is subsumed within the horizontal
debate on proper allocation of jurisdiction. The defendant is protected
not against the court exercising jurisdiction but against the plaintiff who
chooses that court—a subtle but important distinction.
Fairness plays out in formal and substantive ways. Formally, Europeans would question the asserted discrepancy between justice and
consistency.221 To them, the predictability achieved by the Brussels rules
is itself an important element of fairness to the parties.222 Substantively,
Europeans would argue that the rules of the Brussels Regulation are
based on justice considerations. The priority given to jurisdiction in the
defendant’s home country is justified with the defendant’s interest in
being sued at home except under certain conditions. One may deem this
protection ineffective (because in fact the plaintiff can frequently sue at
another forum of her choice)223 or misplaced (because it does not account
224
sufficiently for the interests of the plaintiff), but one cannot claim that
European law of jurisdiction does not address the interests of defendants.
The rules of the Brussels Regulation serve not only to establish detailed rules of allocation of jurisdiction, but also to fulfill the quasiconstitutional function of restricting jurisdiction in order to protect defendants’ due process rights.225 First, such protection is accomplished
through Article 3, which ensures that domiciliaries of the European Union can only be sued in a court designated by the rules of the Brussels
Regulation. Although this protection is not extended to defendants domi226
ciled in other countries, the ECJ has made clear that the protection
applies also against plaintiffs from non-member states.227 Second, the
Court has held repeatedly that Article 2, which gives general jurisdiction
to the defendant’s domicile, serves as a general principle for the interpre220.
Due process does enter the analysis as a restriction with regard to specific bases of
international jurisdiction; for Article 23 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, see von Mehren, supra note 10, at 174–77; Kleinstück, supra note 168, at 166–88.
221.
Supra note 23.
222.
Case C-26/91, Handte & Co. v. Traitements Mécano-chimiques des Surfaces S.A.,
1992 E.C.R. I-3967, para. 15; Schack, supra note 166, at 94, no. 203; Kropholler, supra
note 190, before art. 2, no. 20, at 101; Gardella & Radicati di Brozolo, supra note 185, at 614.
223.
von Mehren, supra note 10, at 192.
224.
The plaintiff’s interests are externalized to the right of access to court; see infra,
Part IV.A.
225.
See Michaels, supra note 59, at 153–54.
226.
Brussels I, supra note 18, art. 4(1); for discussion, see infra Part IV.B.
227.
Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Co. SA v. Universal Gen. Ins. Co., 2000
E.C.R. I-5925; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Sept. 28, 2005, XII ZR
17/03 (II.1.b) (F.R.G.). See also 20 NJW-Rechtsprechungsreport (NJW-RR) 1593 (2005).
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tation of other provisions of the Brussels Regulation, so specific bases of
jurisdiction must be construed narrowly.228 This is intended to protect
defendants. Third, each of the provisions on specific jurisdiction is justified by the close connection between the dispute and the court called
upon for its resolution.229 This serves the double function of ensuring that
only one of the member states has specific jurisdiction for a certain category (e.g., contract) and that the defendant is not sued in an inconvenient
forum.230 Fourth, the Court is willing to restrict the application of certain
problematic provisions. For example, it restricts the jurisdiction of Brussels I Article 6(2) for third-party proceedings to cases in which there is a
“a sufficient connection between the original proceedings and the third
party proceedings to support the conclusion that the choice of forum
231
does not amount to an abuse.” While these words are reminiscent of
the minimum contacts test developed under the Due Process Clause of
232
the U.S. Constitution, the source for the ECJ is not Article 6(1) of the
European Convention on Human Rights, the European provision on due
process, but rather the Brussels Regulation itself.233
Some critics argue that the Brussels Regulation performs the function of restricting jurisdiction for the protection of defendants
inadequately,234 just as the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution
235
performs the function of accounting for federal interests inadequately.
First, the text of the Regulation cannot easily be adapted in individual
228.
See, e.g., Case C-168/02, Kronhofer v. Maier, 2004 E.C.R. I-6009, paras. 12–14;
Case C-26/91, Handte & Co. v. Traitements Mécano-chimiques des Surfaces S.A., 1992
E.C.R. I-3967, para. 14; Case 32/88, Six Constructions v. Humbert, 1989 E.C.R. 341, para.
18; Case 189/87, Kalfelis v. Bankhaus Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst & Co., 1988 E.C.R.
5565, para. 19.
229.
Jenard Report, supra note 189, at 22; Case 21/76, Bier v. Mines de Potasse, 1976
E.C.R. 1735, paras. 10–11; Case 56/79, Zelger v. Salinitri, 1980 E.C.R. 89, para. 3; Case C220/88, Dumez France v. Hessische Landesbank, 1990 E.C.R. I-49, para. 17; Case C-68/93,
Fiona Shevill v. Presse Alliance, 1995 E.C.R. I-415, para. 19; Réunion Européenne v. Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor, 1998 E.C.R. I-6513, para. 27; Case C-256/00, Besix v. WABAG,
2002 E.C.R. I-1699, paras. 30–31; Case C-37/00, Weber v. Ogden Universal Services, 2002
E.C.R. I-2013, para. 39; Case C-168/02, Kronhofer v. Maier, 2004 E.C.R. I-6009, para. 15.
230.
For jurisdiction in contracts and torts, see the analysis in Michaels, supra note 59,
at 151–54; cf. Horatia Muir Watt, Book Review, 94 Revue critique de droit international privé 865, 867–68 (2005) (“enlightening distinction”).
231.
Case C-77/04, GIE Réunion Européenne v. Zurich España, Soptrans., 2005 E.C.R.
I-4509, para. 36 (concerning Brussels Art. 6(2), dealing with third party claims. Art. 6(2)
would be problematic under U.S. constitutional law after the decision in Asahi, 480 U.S. 102).
232.
Note, however, that a sufficient connection must exist to the main proceedings, not
to the court.
233.
See supra Part II.B.2.
234.
See Peter Schlosser, Jurisdiction in International Litigation—The Issue of Human
Rights in Relation to National Law and to the Brussels Convention, 74 Rivista di Diritto
Internazionale 5 (1991).
235.
Supra Part III.A.3.
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cases; the ECJ has repeatedly rejected flexible interpretation of its provisions.236 Second, some applications remain problematic. For example, the
possibility that Brussels I Article 5(3) gives jurisdiction in product liability cases to the place of the accident even if that place was unpredictable
for the defendant would arguably amount to a violation of due process.237
238
As with allocational concerns in the United States, scholars draw opposite conclusions. One is to base restrictions of jurisdiction on texts
outside the Regulation, especially the European Convention on Human
Rights.239 The other is to ignore such considerations altogether.
Yet, the need to consider due process issues is less urgent once we
account for the ways in which defendant protection is externalized out of
the law of jurisdiction altogether. The most important such mechanism is
choice of law. In the United States, adjudicatory jurisdiction is in a majority of cases similar to legislative jurisdiction,240 and if a court finds
241
that it has jurisdiction, it will frequently apply its own law. This is true
in particular for international cases in federal courts, where a court’s subject matter jurisdiction depends on the applicability of U.S. federal law
rather than foreign law.242 But even in cases in which foreign law could
be applied, such application is relatively rare. In domestic courts and
interstate cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has traditionally confined constitutional constraints regarding choice of law to a minimum.243 American
scholars have criticized this discrepancy. Linda Silberman famously
quipped, “To believe that a defendant’s contacts with the forum should
be stronger under the Due Process Clause for jurisdictional purposes
than for choice of law is to believe that an accused is more concerned
with where he will be hanged than whether.”244 Yet presumably, the accused cares neither where he will be hanged (personal jurisdiction), nor
according to whose laws (choice of law); he simply hopes that either
236.
See Jacco Bomhoff, Judicial Discretion in European Law on Conflicts of
Jurisdiction 31–34 (2005).
237.
Schlosser, supra note 17, at 34–36.
238.
See supra text accompanying notes 132, 146–48.
239.
See Guinchard, supra note 66; Grolimund, supra note 66, at 108–14; Nuyts, supra
note 50, at 55–56; Schlosser, supra note 17, at 11–12.
240.
See Weintraub, supra note 14, at 120–22.
241.
Scoles et al., supra note 9, at 167.
242.
The relationship between subject matter jurisdiction and prescriptive jurisdiction is
still unclear. See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003)
(en banc).
243.
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). The U.S. Supreme Court
seemed to suggest otherwise in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, recognizing that “[t]he issue
of personal jurisdiction . . . is entirely distinct from the question of the constitutional limitations on choice of law.” 472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985). But its next decision in the same case
proved this to be largely lip service. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
244.
Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 33,
88 (1978).

MICHAELS FTP3.DOC

1052

1/2/2007 11:15 AM

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 27:1003

jurisdiction or choice of law lead to a favorable result. In this sense, restrictions on jurisdiction and restrictions on choice of law can act as
functional equivalents; a legal order can use one or the other for the
same purpose.245 While U.S. law has focused on the former and neglected
the latter, European law has concentrated on the latter while neglecting
the former. Some areas of choice of law have been unified (most importantly contract law)246 or are about to be (most importantly tort law).247
But even in areas that are not unified, European choice of law has traditionally preferred potentially universal rules over rules that favor forum
law.248 As a consequence, parties are protected from courts applying
home law against them better than in the United States. One explicit policy behind such universal rules is the desire to reduce the incentive for
forum shopping. If the applicable law is the same no matter which forum
the plaintiff chooses, then forum shopping has less impact on the outcome of cases. In fact, one important impetus for the unification of
choice of law rules for contractual obligations lay in the law of jurisdiction, in particular Article 5(1) of the Brussels Regulation, which gives
jurisdiction to the place of performance. Now that choice of law for contracts has been unified, courts all over the Eurpoean Union must apply
the same law to determine the place of performance and should, therefore, find the same courts to have jurisdiction under Article 5(1).

IV. Some Practical Consequences of the
Paradigmatic Difference
The paradigmatic difference is plausible in theory. But does it matter
in practice, especially since paradigms do not determine outcomes? The
245.
See Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 39 Am. J. Comp. L. 249 (1991) (suggesting the use of choice of law
criteria for adjudicatory jurisdiction).
246.
See, e.g., Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Consolidated Version), 1998 O.J. (C 27) 34 (EC); Proposal for a European Parliament and Council
Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, COM (2005) 650 final (Dec.
15, 2005) [hereinafter Rome I]. The Convention will likely be turned into a Community instrument.
247.
Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation on the Law
Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations, COM (2006) 83 final (Feb. 21, 2006) [hereinafter
Rome II]; for the most recent version, see Council Common Position (EC), Interinstitutional
File 2003/0168 (COD), available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st09/
st09751-re07ad01.en06.pdf.
248.
See Mathias Reimann, Conflict of Laws in Western Europe: A Guide
Through the Jungle 105–09 (1994). But see, for a concealed European trend towards applying forum law, Th. M. de Boer, Forum Preferences in Contemporary European Conflicts
Law: The Myth of a “Neutral Choice”, in 1 Festschrift für Erik Jayme 39 (Heinz-Peter
Mansel et al. eds., 2004).
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answer is a clear yes: the difference matters a great deal. While paradigms do not determine outcomes, they shape the discourse that leads to
outcomes. This can be observed in the comparison of U.S. and European
jurisdictional law. The difference can explain why Americans and Europeans, when talking about issues of jurisdiction, talk past each other. It
can account for the style of arguments on each side in negotiations, for
conflicting views on specific issues, and for different views within what
look like apparent similarities.
A. The Role of Due Process
The paradigmatic difference can both highlight and account for differences that go almost unnoted in the literature. One of these is the fact
that due process actually does play a role in European jurisdictional
thought, but its role is directly opposite to that played in the United
States. While the Due Process Clause in the United States protects the
defendant against the unjustified assertion of jurisdiction, the fair trial
principle in European law protects the plaintiff against the unjustified
denial of jurisdiction.249 This is achieved through the doctrine of right of
access to court, protected under ECHR Article 6(1)250 and the European
251
Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as national constitutional provisions like Article 101(1) of the German Basic Law.
This shows that the relevant difference between European and
American jurisdictional law is not that European law is not constitutionalized. Each system is constitutionalized, but only in one regard:
whereas Europe hardly protects defendants under its due process test
(although it could),252 U.S. law does not endorse an explicit general right
of access to court.253 Such a right can be found only indirectly in two
other doctrines. The first is jurisdiction by necessity, the idea that a court
has exceptional jurisdiction if justice so demands, even absent the usual
249.
Peter D. Trooboff, Ten (and Probably More) Difficulties in Negotiating a Worldwide
Convention on International Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments: Some Initial Lessons, in A Global Law of Jurisdiction: Lessons From the Hague 263, 271–72 (John J.
Barceló III & Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002).
250.
Golder v. United Kingdom, App. No. 4451/70, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 524, para. 36
(1979); Airey v. Ireland (No. 1), App. No. 6289/73, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 305 (1979);
Grolimund, supra note 66, at 94–95.
251.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 47, Dec. 7, 2000, O.J. (C
364) 1, 40 I.L.M. 266 (2001), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.
pdf.
252.
Supra Part II.B.1.
253.
The desire of a state to grant an effective forum can, however, be a relevant criterion
regarding constitutionality of exercising jurisdiction. See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
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requirements, because no other forum is available to the plaintiff.254 This
idea has occasionally been used to rationalize court decisions255 but is
256
usually either confined to a minimum or rejected out of hand as an in257
dependent basis for jurisdiction. The U.S. Supreme Court has
suggested such a basis might be possible,258 but has never endorsed it.
The second doctrine is the duty of courts to exercise the jurisdiction they
have been given by the legislature, which is sometimes used as an argument against forum non conveniens.259 Notably, this duty exists between
the court and the legislature; the benefit to the plaintiff is merely incidental. In Europe, by contrast, the plaintiff has an explicit right of access to
court.
To understand this striking contrast, it is first necessary to place it in
context. It is not the case that Americans care more about defendants
while Europeans care more about plaintiffs. If anything, the opposite is
true. As one expert has put it, with some overstatement, “American
courts are the plaintiff’s heaven. In contrast, the European courts, particularly the German courts, are the defendant’s heaven.”260 That the U.S.
Constitution protects defendants while European constitutional law protects plaintiffs is not meant to create an imbalance but rather to counter
an imbalance that would otherwise exist. Without restrictions, U.S. law
of jurisdiction would be extremely plaintiff-friendly, and European law
would be extremely defendant-friendly.
However, this insight only shifts the question; we still need to know
why these respective imbalances exist. The paradigmatic difference,
combined with a historical picture, provides an explanation that can be
sketched as follows. In a world with relatively few transnational transactions, where each party and each transaction could clearly be placed in
one and only one state, the paradigmatic difference would not matter:
254.
Tracy L. Troutman, Note, Jurisdiction by Necessity: Examining One Proposal for
Unbarring the Doors of our Courts, 21 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 401 (1988); Scoles et al.,
supra note 9, at 348–50.
255.
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); see George B.
Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessity—An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 305
(1951); Martin H. Redish & Eric J. Beste, Personal Jurisdiction and the Global Resolution of
Mass Tort Litigation: Defining the Constitutional Boundaries, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 917,
936–37 (1995).
256.
von Mehren, supra note 100, at 322; Troutman, supra note 254; Scoles et al.,
supra note 9, at 350.
257.
Brilmayer, supra note 117, at 108–10; Stanley E. Cox, Symposium, Case Four:
Choice of Law Theory, 20 New Eng. L. Rev. 684, 685 n.2 (1995).
258.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 n.13 (1984); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 211 n.37 (1977).
259.
For the similar argument in German law, see Schack, supra note 202, at 194.
260.
See Schlosser, supra note 17, at 37.
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both a domestic and an international paradigm would always lead to exactly one state having jurisdiction. The rise in international transactions
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries upset this parallelism between
the domestic and the international paradigms, since it had opposite effects on each paradigm. For the U.S. paradigm, with its unilateral and
vertical focus, it led to ever more courts with jurisdiction, since more
courts had a certain degree of contact with the parties or the transactions.261 The legal system reacted by restricting the number of available
fora by providing for protection of defendants based on fairness. The
effect on the multilateral European paradigm was exactly the opposite.
Here, potential defendants were able to play the system and make sure
the closest connection, which alone gives jurisdiction, existed to a court
in which effective protection of plaintiffs was not possible. The legal
system reacted by providing a right to effective judicial protection. The
paradigmatic difference does not lead, therefore, to a necessary difference in the respective protection of plaintiffs and defendants. In effect, it
may or may not be the case that plaintiffs and defendants are both protected to the same degree in the U.S. and in Europe. But the way in
which this balance is achieved is very different.
B. Natural Forum and Discrimination Against
Third Country Domiciliaries
Another issue onto which the paradigmatic difference sheds light is
the discrimination between domestic and foreign parties. Both U.S. and
European laws of jurisdiction discriminate against foreigners, but they
do so in different ways. While European law distinguishes between domestic and foreign defendants in the application of the Brussels regime,
U.S. law distinguishes between domestic and foreign plaintiffs in the
application of forum non conveniens. The existence of both these forms
of discrimination can be explained with the paradigmatic difference:
what seems almost shockingly unjust within one paradigm is perfectly
normal in another.
U.S. law does not discriminate against foreign defendants; the Due
Process Clause protects both U.S. and foreign citizens and
domiciliaries.262 Europe, by contrast, distinguishes between European
and foreign defendants: the Brussels Regulation protects European defendants against the expansive bases of jurisdiction still existing under
member state laws, but this protection does not extend to non-EU residents, against whom the exorbitant national bases of jurisdiction can still
261.
262.

See Michaels, supra note 12, at 53.
See Troutman, supra note 254.
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be used.263 Although such judgments rest on jurisdictional bases explicitly condemned by the Brussels Regulation, these judgments are still
entitled to automatic recognition within the European Union; other
member states cannot even invoke a public policy exception against
these bases.264 Whereas Americans have been extremely critical of this
265
266
discrimination, only some Europeans concur with the criticism; more
267
often they do not see anything wrong with the distinction.
The situation is reversed with regard to foreign plaintiffs. Here it is
European law that draws no distinction between domestic and foreign
plaintiffs.268 U.S. law, by contrast, explicitly distinguishes between foreign and domestic plaintiffs,269 to some limited extent in the law of
270
jurisdiction, but more importantly in the application of forum non conveniens, where the plaintiff’s domicile is a decisive factor in determining
the relative appropriateness of the U.S. forum.271 Europeans view this as
272
blatant and unjustified protectionism, while many Americans see nothing wrong in closing their courts to what they perceive as forum
shopping by foreigners.
Why do Europeans condone discrimination against foreign defendants, while Americans have no problem with discriminating against
foreign plaintiffs? One important explanation is that Europeans consider
the defendant’s domicile the natural forum and another forum chosen by
the plaintiff as the exception,273 while Americans think of the plaintiff’s
263.
See supra text accompanying notes 194–201.
264.
See Case C-7/98, Krombach v. Bamberski, 2000 E.C.R. I-1935; Brussels I, supra
note 18, art. 35(3).
265.
See, especially, von Mehren, supra note 196, at 1058–59 (1981) (directly juxtaposing the nondiscriminatory due process clause in the United States and the discriminatory
provision in Article 3 of the Brussels I regime); for further references, see supra note 196.
266.
Supra note 194.
267.
Hélène Gaudemet-Tallon, Les frontières extérieures de l’espace judiciaire européen: quelques repères, in E Pluribus Unum—Liber Amicorum Georges A.L. Droz 85,
85–87 (Alegría Borrás et al. eds., 1996). See Grolimund, supra note 199, at 218 (suggesting
that the discrimination against foreigners as such creates no problems; only the exorbitant
character of the national bases of jurisdiction applied against them is potentially problematic).
268.
Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Co. SA v. Universal Gen. Ins. Co., 2000
E.C.R. I-5925. See also Schlosser, supra note 17, at 24 (“a fundamental human judicial
right”).
269.
This question is distinct from the more general question of whether foreign plaintiffs fare better or worse generally than domestic plaintiffs. For the most recent empirical
studies suggesting that they fare equally well, see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Xenophilia or Xenophobia in American Courts? Before and After 9/11, (Cornell Law Sch.
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 06-018, Aug. 08, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=923595.
270.
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
271.
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255–56 (1981).
272.
Schack, supra note 166, at 220, no. 496.
273.
Supra note 228.
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domicile as the natural forum, which is unacceptable only when jurisdiction there would violate the defendant’s due process rights. But this
answer immediately creates a new question: why do Americans and
Europeans differ on what is the natural forum?
Again, the paradigmatic difference provides a clue. As regards U.S.
law, recall that the U.S. paradigm is political. Jurisdiction over defendants must be justified in political terms, especially if those defendants
are not part of the community that asserts jurisdiction. On the flipside of
this argument, courts have a political responsibility to provide protection
for their own citizens’ rights, and therefore to open their courts to them,
even where they would not open them to others. U.S. courts frequently
invoke this notion of a political relationship between courts and their
domiciliaries.
Notably, such invocations are absent from European decisions on jurisdiction. Here, discrimination against foreign defendants is not seen as
a problem simply because jurisdiction is viewed as apolitical. The original reason for the discrimination was merely one of limited competence
in the European Union: since the goal was unification of laws within the
common market, third country domiciliaries were simply not at stake.274
The Brussels Convention did not go beyond what seemed necessary for
the common market. The international relationship to other countries
that defined the paradigm was simply different vis-à-vis EU member
states and other States. In the United States, the situation would be the
same if the constitutional law of jurisdiction were based on the Full Faith
and Credit Clause rather than the Due Process Clause, because full faith
and credit would also limit jurisdiction only vis-à-vis sister states, not
vis-à-vis foreign nations.275 Currently, calls in Europe to abolish the discrimination against foreign defendants are growing louder,276 a sign that
this discrimination is now viewed as a mere accident.
C. State Boundaries and Extraterritoriality
The paradigmatic difference not only explains manifest differences,
but also reveals that some apparent similarities rest on misunderstanding.
One such apparent similarity is the prominence of territorial connections
and state boundaries within each paradigm.277 Territoriality is still central
to jurisdictional thinking in both the United States and Europe. In the
United States, the territorial focus has survived the shift in theories in
274.
Supra text accompanying notes 197–198.
275.
See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185, 190 (1912) (regarding enforcement of foreign nation judgments).
276.
Supra note 199.
277.
See Ralf Michaels, Territorial Jurisdiction After Territoriality, in Globalisation
and Jurisdiction 105, 107–13 (Piet-Jan Slot & Mielle Bulterman eds., 2004).
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U.S. jurisdictional law.278 For example, the move from service of process
in Pennoyer to minimum contacts in International Shoe as a requirement
for jurisdiction did not change the fact that jurisdiction is still about state
borders, and minimum contacts are contacts to a territory.279 Similarly,
jurisdiction in Europe is still largely about places:280 the most important
connecting factors—the defendant’s residence, the place of the tort, and
the place of performance—are all territorial. Extraterritorial jurisdiction
is rejected by both legal systems (at least in principle) and requires spe281
cial justification.
Yet, in accordance with their respective paradigms, Americans and
Europeans understand extraterritoriality to mean different things. Although territoriality and state boundaries are central to both U.S. and
European thinking about jurisdiction, they play different roles in each
paradigm. In the domestic U.S. paradigm, the role of boundaries is one
of delimitation. The power of a court goes to the state’s boundaries, not
beyond them. It is fair to force a defendant into a court in the state with
minimum contacts, but not beyond its boundaries. This delimiting function protects the jurisdiction of other states, but the interference with
other states’ interests is not in itself a limit on jurisdiction (as it would be
if it were based on the Full Faith and Credit Clause); it is merely incidental to protecting the defendant.282 By contrast, the role of state
boundaries in the international European paradigm is one of allocation:
the locus of an event or a party defines the place that has jurisdiction in a
multilateral fashion. The problem with extraterritorial jurisdiction is that
it interferes with another state’s jurisdiction, not that it exceeds the forum state’s power over the defendant, because the power aspect of
jurisdiction is not emphasized in the first place. Here, the protection of
the defendant against the court is merely incidental to this allocational
function.283
These differences may appear subtle, but they become relevant in
real cases. Europeans frequently accuse U.S. courts of judicial hegemonialism, because U.S. courts assert jurisdiction without regard to other
284
countries. This is clearly a criticism reflecting an international para278.
For a more general history of the importance of territoriality in U.S. law and foreign
relations, see Kal Raustiala, The Evolution of Territoriality: International Relations and
American Law, in Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization 219 (Miles
Kahler & Barbara Walter eds., 2006).
279.
Weinstein, supra note 78, at 210; see also Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S.
604, 609–10 (1990).
280.
Michaels, supra note 59, at 129.
281.
Michaels, supra note 12, at 51.
282.
Supra Part III.C.1.
283.
Supra Part III.B.3.
284.
Supra note 12.
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digm, in which the vertical relationship of equality between different
states is prime. Within a vertical and domestic paradigm, these relations
285
are secondary to the relationship between court and the parties —
hegemonialism is at best incidental to, but certainly not a goal of U.S.
assertions of jurisdiction. By contrast, where Americans criticize certain
European bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction, they do so with a view to
the interests of defendants. Exorbitant bases of jurisdiction are criticized
not because they violate the interests of other countries, but because they
violate the interests of defendants.286 This reflects a horizontal paradigm.
Sometimes, this clash in perspective is visible in one case. European
protests against U.S. assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction, based on
international concerns, frequently meet the response that such assertion
is necessary for the protection of rights, based on domestic concerns.287
How the paradigmatic difference plays out in practice can be seen best in
a rereading of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hartford Fire v.
California,288 which, although it concerns legislative rather than
adjudicatory jurisdiction, is symptomatic of the paradigmatic difference.
When U.S. courts asserted jurisdiction over British reinsurers based on
the effects of their conduct on the U.S. market, Europeans protested
against what they perceived as unjustified extraterritorial jurisdiction.
The arguments by Europeans and the Court revealed the paradigmatic
difference. Europeans criticized U.S. courts for interfering with their
sovereign interests by disallowing conduct that was perfectly legal in the
United Kingdom only because of the effects they had on the U.S.
market. This protest was based on an international paradigm, focusing
on the territorial allocation of jurisdiction between different countries. In
this conflict of competing policies, they argued, Europeans should
prevail because the defendants and their conduct were located in Europe.
The response by the majority in the U.S. Supreme Court did not really
address this criticism at all. Curiously, the Court held there was no true
conflict:289 since the conduct that was illegal under U.S. law was not
required under U.K. law, the defendants were not in a true conflict
situation—they could easily comply with both laws. Obviously, the
notion of a true conflict was different for the U.S. Supreme Court. The
U.S. response focused not on the horizontal conflict between countries
285.
See also Michaels, supra note 12, at 53.
286.
See supra notes 20–22.
287.
See Michaels, supra note 12, at 46–47, 52.
288.
509 U.S. 764 (1993).
289.
Id. at 799. The dissent addressed international concerns under the rubric of comity.
See also Andreas Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balance of Interests, and the Exercise of Jurisdiction to
Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 42, 50 (1995)
(pointing out that the Court misunderstood the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law).
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(as had the European criticism), but on the conflicting vertical
obligations of the defendant. Here, no such undue interference existed,
because the defendants did not face a conflict. For Europeans, the
conflict was a horizontal one between the United States and the United
Kingdom. For Americans, the potential conflict could be only a vertical
one between the requirements set by U.S. law and the conflicting
requirements set by the defendant’s home country law.
Another example concerns extraterritorial jurisdiction over places
within no country’s territory. In Smith v. United States,290 the U.S.
Supreme Court held the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) inapplicable to
torts committed in Antarctica because Antarctica was a foreign country
for purposes of the Act. Obviously, this decision is not made out of an
international concern about interfering with another country’s
jurisdiction, because Antarctica has no government.291 As a consequence,
292
the plaintiff in Smith was left without an effective forum. The same
argument was made, although ultimately without success, against federal
court jurisdiction over detainees in Guantánamo Bay.293 Although the
294
question was about territorial boundaries, no one seriously considered
the jurisdiction of Cuban courts as an alternative to U.S. court, as one
would in an international paradigm.
Although European courts have also looked to international law in
order to determine the territorial contacts necessary for jurisdiction,295 the
result in Smith, insofar as it concerns adjudicatory jurisdiction, would be
296
unlikely in Europe. First, adjudicatory jurisdiction always lies in
defendants’ home courts, and territorial restrictions in statutes are
matters for choice of law, not adjudicatory jurisdiction. Second,
jurisdiction is declined only in view of other available fora;297 if no other
forum is available, denying jurisdiction would violate the plaintiff’s right
of access to courts. This argument is consistent with an international
290.
507 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1993); similarly, for the Fair Labor Standards Act, see Smith
v. Raytheon Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 397, 401–02 (D. Mass. 2004). But see Arnett v. Comm’r, 126
T.C. 89, 95 (2006) (Antarctica is not a foreign country for purposes of the Tax Code).
291.
Brilmayer, supra note 116, at 295; Brilmayer, supra note 104, at 271.
292.
Jonathan Blum, Note, The Deep Freeze: Torts, Choice of Law, and the Antarctic
Treaty Regime, 8 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 667, 669, 686 (1994).
293.
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 498–500 (2004) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
294.
See Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2501 (2005).
295.
See Case C-37/00, Weber v. Ogden Universal Services, 2002 E.C.R. I-2013 (applying the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf in order to determine whether a
platform off the Dutch coast was in the Netherlands for the purpose of article 5(1) of the Brussels Regulation).
296.
See Michaels, supra note 59, at 134–36.
297.
Supra text accompanying notes 205–06.
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paradigm, in which the limits of the forum state’s sovereignty as such
play a lesser role,298 while allocational issues matter more.
D. Forum non conveniens, Lis alibi pendens,
and Parallel Proceedings
The paradigmatic difference can also serve to explain the difference
in American and European attitudes towards specific doctrines, notably
forum non conveniens, lis alibi pendens, and antisuit injunctions. Forum
non conveniens, by now an important doctrine of U.S. law, is rejected in
Europe. The European Court of Justice has refused to allow U.K. courts
to apply the doctrine in cases without connections to any member
299
states. Many explain this difference by pointing out that Europeans
favor consistency and predictability over justice in individual cases,
whereas Americans focus more on justice in individual cases and less on
predictability and consistency.300 It is true that predictability played an
important role when the ECJ rejected forum non conveniens in the
Brussels Regulation.301 But U.S. courts emphasize formalism in applying
rules in other areas of the law, while Europeans grant discretion to their
302
courts. The difference regarding forum non conveniens must be explained otherwise.
Here again, the paradigmatic difference is helpful. The comparison
to this point has made clear that, in U.S. law, forum non conveniens
serves two purposes not covered appropriately by the Due Process
Clause. The first is the function of judicial “fine tuning”303—the development of specific rules for the individual case. The second is the
function of “jurisdictional equilibration”304—the horizontal, international
allocation of jurisdiction in view of other countries’ positions. In Europe,
where both these functions are served by the normal jurisdiction provisions, forum non conveniens would add little in this respect. Europeans
point out that the need for forum non conveniens is reduced with
increased specificity and quality of rules on jurisdiction:305 “fine tuning”
is unnecessary if jurisdictional rules are already finely tuned. More
generally, the rules on jurisdiction contained in regimes like the Brussels
298.
Michaels, supra note 59, at 136.
299.
Case C-281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-1383.
300.
Clermont, supra note 49, at 103–04; Bomhoff, supra note 236, at 30–34.
301.
Owusu, 2005 E.C.R. I-1383, paras. 39–41.
302.
P.S. Atiyah & Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American
Law 32 (2005) (“the American system relies far more on formal reasoning than many English
lawyers believe.”); Bomhoff, supra note 236.
303.
von Mehren, supra note 10, at 306.
304.
Burbank, supra note 24, at 205–06; Burbank, supra note 52, at 395–403.
305.
Schlosser Report, supra note 189, para. 78; Schack, supra note 166, at 220, no.
495.
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Regulation are thought to typify the considerations relevant in a forum
non conveniens analysis.306 This is true also for the multilateral
considerations that due process cannot encompass adequately, but that
307
European law fulfills with other means. In other words, Europeans do
not think that a system of horizontally-based jurisdiction needs to be
supplemented by a horizontal institution like forum non conveniens to
provide a missing element.
The reciprocal is true for lis alibi pendens. Americans do not think
that vertical notions of jurisdiction imply the supremacy (or exclusivity)
of one proceeding over others that may be brought. Regarding the treatment of parallel proceedings between U.S. law and European law, two
differences are notable. First, European law tries to avoid parallel proceedings from the beginning through rules on lis alibi pendens. If
another court is already seized with an affair, the second court seized
must decline jurisdiction.308 European law allows courts to decline jurisdiction by discretion in favor of proceedings before another court only
for related actions.309 U.S. law, by contrast, has a similarly strict rule only
for the recognition stage: the first decision rendered becomes binding on
310
other courts. So European law focuses entirely on a priority of the
court first seized,311 while U.S. law focuses largely on the priority of the
judgment rendered. Second, to the extent that U.S. law addresses parallel
proceedings earlier, it gives the judge three options: stop her own proceedings in favor of the other court (forum non conveniens), try to stop
the proceedings in the other court in favor of her own proceedings (antisuit injunctions), or do nothing, but there are no mandatory rules.
Europe, by contrast, opposes antisuit injunctions entirely.312
It should be obvious how the first of these two differences links with
the paradigmatic difference. Because European rules on jurisdiction are
understood to be international and multilateral, one court’s decision
about its jurisdiction necessarily includes a decision about the potential
jurisdiction of other courts. It follows that the first court’s decision that it
has jurisdiction can be given effect against all other courts, since other
courts could not validly invoke any multilateral factors that are not already inherent in the provisions applied by the original court. It is a
misunderstanding, therefore, to complain that in dealing with parallel
306.
Kropholler, supra note 204, at 595–96; Schack, supra note 166, at 223, no. 502.
307.
For a detailed comparison, see Nuyts, supra note 47, at 368–456 (2003).
308.
Brussels I, supra note 18, art. 27. See Peter E. Herzog, Brussels and Lugano,
Should You Race to the Courthouse or Race for a Judgment?, 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 379 (1995).
309.
Brussels I, supra note 18, art. 28.
310.
Herzog, supra note 308.
311.
Kropholler, supra note 190, art. 27, no. 1.
312.
Case C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 2004 E.C.R. I-3565; for criticism, see Hartley,
supra note 23, at 821–23; Fentiman, supra note 25, at 83, 111–26.
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proceedings “the [Brussels] Convention system makes no attempt to decide which of the two courts is more appropriate.”313 Rather, all rules of
the Brussels Regulation carry the presumption that they assign jurisdic314
tion to courts that are a priori equally appropriate, so no further forum
non conveniens test is necessary. In this sense, lis alibi pendens is the
formal resolution of a conflict between different courts all deemed similarly appropriate vis-à-vis each other. For U.S. law, on the other hand, it
makes sense to deal with parallel proceedings only at the recognition
stage, because until then each court assumes (or denies) its jurisdiction
regardless of others on a unilateral basis, and thus in relative obliviousness to the situation of other states’ or countries’ courts.
The paradigmatic difference also does much to explain the differing
views on antisuit injunctions. Proponents make two arguments to defend
such injunctions in the context of the Brussels Regulation. First, such
injunctions are not directed against the other court but against the party;
as a consequence, the injunctions do not interfere with another court’s
autonomy.315 Second, antisuit injunctions actually promote the ideals of
the Brussels Regulation, because they help divest foreign courts from
316
exercising jurisdiction that they do not rightfully have.
These arguments are telling because they make sense only in the
American, not in the European paradigm. The first argument—that injunctions are directed against the parties rather than foreign courts—
presumes an understanding of jurisdiction in which the relevant relationship is the vertical one between the court and the parties, not the
horizontal relationship to other courts. At the same time, the argument
fits a domestic paradigm. Antisuit injunctions help a court maintain litigation within its domestic realm over the obstruction of a party. Whether
this obstruction takes place through “domestic” contempt of court or by
bringing suit in a foreign court matters little; in both cases the vertical
relation between the court and the defendant is all that counts, and
measures of the court are directed only against the party before it. As
strong as these arguments are in the U.S. paradigm, they are weak within
the European paradigm. In a vertical and international paradigm, injunctions undeniably interfere with other courts’ autonomy.317
The second argument—that injunctions actually support the Brussels
regime—makes sense in a unilateral system in which each court interprets
313.
Hartley, supra note 23, at 816.
314.
Supra text before note 210.
315.
Turner v. Grovit, [2000] 1 Q.B. 345, 364 (C.A. 1999).
316.
See Hartley, supra note 23.
317.
Some common law lawyers concede this; see, e.g., Fentiman, supra note 25, at 124;
see also the debate in Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 927
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
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jurisdictional rules in isolation from others, and in which multilateral considerations must be contributed through other means. In the multilateral
European paradigm, this argument must fail. If each court, in deciding
whether it has jurisdiction, must make its decision multilaterally, then it
must also consider all the vertical arguments in view of the claims of other
courts to jurisdiction, and no court should restrain another court from
making this decision autonomously. The question both courts face is the
same and neither of them is hierarchically superior to the other.318
E. The Style of the Hague Negotiations
Finally, we return to the Hague negotiations. Different paradigmatic
positions help explain some under-appreciated features of the negotiation
process. First, they help expose a startling difference in perception of
what the negotiations were about.319 For the U.S. side, the negotiations
represented a matter of bargaining over power positions, while Europeans considered the negotiation as a common attempt to find the best
rules for a quasi-codification. In the United States, various academic articles described the negotiations as a matter of trade or bargain.320 Of
course, Europeans also acted strategically, maintaining both the applica321
bility of exorbitant bases of jurisdiction against third states and the
322
reciprocity requirement for recognizing foreign judgments in order to
improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States.323 Such
318.
Of course, whether such considerations occur in fact, and whether all courts in the
European Union are equally well-equipped, is a different matter. For debate, see Felix Blobel
& Patrick Späth, The Tale of Multilateral Trust and the European Law of Civil Procedure, 30
Eur. L. Rev. 528 (2005).
319.
This is a simplified account that cannot grasp the subtleties of the negotiations.
320.
Ronald A. Brand, Recognition of Foreign Judgments as a Trade Law Issue: The
Economics of Private International Law, in Economic Issues in International Law: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives 592, 592–93 (Bhandari & Sykes eds., 1998); Russell
J. Weintraub, How Substantial is Our Need for a Judgments-Recognition Convention and
What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 Brook. J. Int’l L. 167 (1998). But see the criticism of such an approach by Andreas Lowenfeld, supra note 17, at 302.
321.
Supra text accompaying note 200.
322.
Schack, supra note 166, at 377. For the impact of the German requirement on U.S.
judgments, see Wolfgang Wurmnest, Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Money Judgments
in Germany, 23 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 175, 186–88 (2005); see also Christoph Schärtl,
Das Spiegelbildprinzip im Rechtsverkehr mit ausländischen Staatenverbindungen
unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des deutsch-amerikanischen Rechtsverkehrs
264–71 (2005).
323.
The latter may have backfired. The ALI proposes the reintroduction of a reciprocity
requirement into U.S. law. See ALI Judgments Statute, supra note 159, § 7, at 94, 97;
Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Hague Judgments Convention—And Perhaps
Beyond, in Law and Justice in a Multistate World, supra note 46, at 121, 134–35. The
result is a prisoners’ dilemma in which, absent a treaty, no side will take the first step towards
cooperation, unless it is willing to use the “tit for tat” strategy; for such a proposal, see Tho-
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strategies notwithstanding, the ideal end result for Europeans closer resembled a codification of best jurisdictional practices than a treaty. This
preference for codification may explain the remarkable lack of interest
among European academics and practitioners in the negotiations, compared to the intense reactions within the United States. Certainly, the fact
that a codification of best practices of jurisdiction already existed,
namely in form of the Brussels Convention,324 made the Hague negotiations look like a relatively technical matter. It also explains why
Europeans hoped for a broad convention covering many areas of the law.
In their view, a convention that unified only restricted areas was not
worth the candle.325 Americans, on the other hand, were happy to agree
on some matters they thought were favorable to them and leave other
areas to the unregulated status quo. A codification requires widereaching unification of law; a treaty does not.
It is not enough to point to the general preference of civil law countries for codification as the sole explanation for the difference in
negotiation styles,326 because this preference for codification must be
explained within the realm of jurisdiction. The difference in attitude is
better explained with reference to the two paradigms. One obvious explanation lies in the political character of American jurisdictional
thinking, which lends itself more to the process of give-and-take bargaining than the apolitical European understanding of jurisdiction.
Another explanation may be counterintuitive at first, but ultimately more
important: a unilateral paradigm of jurisdiction is more appropriate for
international unification through negotiations and bargaining.327 If a
country first determines its own scope of jurisdiction without regard to
the interests of other countries, it is easier to define a bargaining position
for negotiations with a view to a rational bargain leading to a mutually
optimal result.328 By contrast, the multilateral paradigm Europeans endorse does not lend itself so easily to international bargaining. Because
mas Pfeiffer, Kooperative Reziprozität– § 328 I Nr. 5 ZPO neu besichtigt, 55 RabelsZ 734,
742–43 (1991).
324.
Supra note 18.
325.
Schack, supra note 34, at 316.
326.
Hartley, supra note 23, at 813–14. This difference between civil law and common
law has always been exaggerated. See, e.g., Hein Kötz, Taking Civil Codes Less Seriously, 50
Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1987); see also Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the
Common Law World, 25 Yale J. Int’l L. 435 (2000). For the question to what extent Brussels
I is influenced by civil law, see the references supra notes 185–186.
327.
See Ralf Michaels, Three Paradigms of Legal Unification: National, International,
Transnational, 96 ASIL Proceedings 333, 334–35 (2002).
328.
Cf. Brand, supra note 320 (discussing the negotiations as a bargaining process); for
prescriptive jurisdiction, see also Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 (2001); Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations,
90 Geo. L.J. 883 (2002).
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Europeans have already adopted potentially universal rules, their interest
is more in transposing these rules to the global level, as they did by using
the Brussels Regulation as a model for the Hague. Only the conventionas-bargain model fits well into the political and unilateral paradigm of
jurisdiction in the United States, while the convention-as-codification
model goes better with the European apolitical, multilateral paradigm.
The paradigmatic difference provides a good explanation for another
issue. Europeans preferred to unify both the law of recognition and enforcement and the law of jurisdiction in a “double convention,” in which
every imaginable basis of jurisdiction would be either required or prohibited for purposes of jurisdiction and enforcement. By contrast,
Americans supported a “mixed convention,” which would have included
agreement on both required and forbidden grounds of jurisdiction, but
would have retained a third gray zone of bases that are neither required
nor prohibited, but merely permitted.329 Clearly, such a model works well
in the framework of a bargain—bases on which agreement cannot be
reached are left in the gray zone, which represents the state of nature.330
The mixed convention is much more anathema to the framework of codification, for which a residual area of state of nature is much more alien.
This is certainly one important reason why Europeans rejected the model
331
until quite recently: there was the fear that the gray zone could become
332
too large. Thus, while it is probably correct to point out that the Hague
process would have been more promising if the negotiating partners had
333
focused on a mixed convention from the beginning, adoption of a
mixed convention model would not have been a neutral step either. It
would have been an accommodation of the U.S. versus the European
paradigm of jurisdiction.
329.
For explanations of the mixed convention, see von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, supra note 34, at 282–87 (1994); Arthur T. von Mehren, The
Case for a Convention-mixte Approach to Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Recognition and
Enforcement on Foreign Judgments, 61 RabelsZ 86 (1997). The meaning of a mixed convention has always been ambiguous; see Michaels, supra note 142 Part II.4.
330.
Michaels, supra note 142, Part IV.1.
331.
Schack, supra note 34, at 316, 326–27, 331; Haimo Schack, Entscheidungszuständigkeiten in einem weltweiten Gerichtsstands- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommen, 8
ZEuP 931, 931–32 (1998); Olivier Tell, Tentative Draft on the Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Can a Mixed Convention Work?, in A Global Law of
Jurisdiction and Judgments, supra note 36, at 37.
332.
Schack, supra note 34; Borràs, supra note 10, at 51.
333.
von Mehren, supra note 36, at 198–200 (2001); Brand, supra note 45, at 5–9; von
Mehren & Michaels, supra note 201; see also McClean, supra note 35, at 263.
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V. Conclusions
Both Americans and Europeans discussing jurisdictional issues
sometimes claim universal applicability for their theories.334 This Article
has shown the limits to such claims. Jurisdictional regimes in the United
States and Europe are functionally equivalent insofar as they must deal
with similar problems, namely the horizontal allocation of jurisdiction
between states and the vertical protection of parties against courts. Yet
differences exist not only between the rules, institutions, and theories,
but also between the paradigms within which each side creates and justifies these rules, institutions, and theories.
This argument provides responses to the convergence thesis laid out
in the introduction. All three variants of the convergence thesis are too
narrowly focused on individual problems and institutions. Paradigms, by
emphasizing how all such institutions interact with whole legal systems,
can explain why convergence does not occur. This is true for all three
variants of the thesis. Even under economic pressure of globalization,
path dependency provides an answer to why different legal systems
achieve different institutional solutions that are efficient in their respective legal systems. Functional equivalence can explain not only how
different legal systems largely reach the same results by different
(equivalent) means, but also why, since legal systems differ in the means
they use to fulfill similar functions, functional equivalence enables difference rather than similarity.335 Paradigms can show how legal solutions
are embedded, if not in amorphous and general national cultures, at least
in general national argumentative patterns that lead to different responses
to similar problems.
At the same time, the paradigmatic difference suggests the risks involved in criticizing solutions from another legal system. Since the critic
argues from a paradigm different from the rules she criticizes, she may
risk holding an inappropriate standard to that law.
So, what is to be done? One might be tempted to try and create a
neutral paradigm transcending the differences by combining the two existing paradigms. A neutral paradigm would be one that gives equal
weight to the vertical relation between the court and the parties and the
334.
von Mehren, supra note 100, at 281 (“the theoretical analysis proposed is intended
to have general application and to illuminate any contemporary legal order’s efforts to address
the problem of adjudicatory jurisdiction in principled terms”); Schröder, supra note 166, at
109 (“The idea of the jurisdiction-focused procedural interests is legitimate under every legal
order. One may even tend towards the view that the jurisdictional interests reflect, secularize
(if the notion is allowed) certain logical structures of procedure.”) (Ralf Michaels trans.). But
cf. Pfeiffer, supra note 110, at 19–20 (explicitly limiting his findings to German law).
335.
Michaels, supra note 3, at 371–72.
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horizontal relation between the courts of different states. Such an idea
faces serious problems. First, each paradigm already contains a combination of both horizontal and vertical considerations. The U.S. paradigm
is vertical, but it accounts for horizontal considerations partly through
subsumption, partly through externalization. The European paradigm is
horizontal, but it likewise accounts for vertical considerations through
subsumption and externalization. That each paradigm accounts for both
kinds of considerations provides an explanation for why each of them is
relatively stable. Second, because horizontal and vertical relations are
incommensurable, it is hard to imagine a paradigm that gives equal
weight to both without determining what equal weight would actually
mean. Quite possibly, subsumption and externalization of one of the two
considerations is a more successful way of achieving such commensurability.
If anything, the relative stability of each paradigm provides a strong
caveat against any hope for easy unification. Comparative lawyers often
claim that unification of laws is made easier by the insight that different
legal systems fulfill the same functions through different means—the
idea of functional equivalence.336 Such a hope undoubtedly lay at the
base of the Hague negotiations. The failure of these negotiations yields
evidence for the opposite claim: functional equivalence provides strong
arguments against unification.337 Functional equivalence thus serves,
ironically, to explain the failure of the Hague negotiations. Precisely because different legal orders can fulfill the same functions by different
means, they are not forced to surrender their own means for others if
those other means are not superior but “equivalent.”338 To adopt the
functionally equivalent institution of another law does not yield great
benefits—because that institution will only fulfill the same functions—
while creating great costs.339 And since legal orders function as whole
entities, unification of individual elements has likely ramifications in
340
other parts of the legal system. The recent unhappiness in the United
341
Kingdom over the degree to which the Brussels Regulation interferes
with areas thought to be separate from jurisdiction—forum non conveniens and antisuit injunctions—is both proof of this thesis and a warning
for unification proposals.
336.
Supra note 3.
337.
Michaels, supra note 3, at 376–78.
338.
Id. at 374.
339.
Id.
340.
See Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying
Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 Mod. L. Rev. 11, 12 (1998).
341.
See Hartley, supra note 23.
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If this is so, then unification of jurisdictional law may be possible
neither within one paradigm nor through a combination of both paradigms, but only through a common paradigm shift. It is unlikely that
either Europeans or Americans will adopt the other side’s paradigm.
More likely is the realization that both paradigms are inadequate. The
Hague negotiations failed not only because of differences between the
negotiating parties, but also because new issues arose that posed seemingly insurmountable challenges to all participants: the Internet,
intellectual property, and human rights litigation. Both Americans and
Europeans struggle with the difficulties of territorializing the Internet,
the global proliferation of IP-protected goods, the urgent desire to render
justice to victims of human rights violations, and the existence of global
cartels. Neither the American nor the European approach seems able to
cope properly with the challenges these issues pose, and both fail for
similar reasons.
If U.S. and European approaches to jurisdiction are equally unable
to resolve certain issues, this suggests the problem is not so much a paradigmatic difference between the two, but rather a common inadequacy.
Both the domestic and the international paradigms rely on the traditional
image of sovereignty in what is often referred to as the Westphalian
model. Sovereignty in this sense has two aspects. One of them, the exclusive power of a state to regulate events within its territory,
corresponds well with the domestic paradigm of jurisdiction. The other
aspect, the mutual recognition between sovereign states, corresponds
with the international paradigm of jurisdiction. If this traditional image
of sovereignty is inadequate under conditions of globalization, as is frequently claimed, then both paradigms are similarly inadequate as well,
and both sides must come together to create a new, third paradigm of
jurisdiction. But this remains a topic for another study.

